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HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
While no legal obstacles prevent the U.S. Senate's
reconsideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT),I lingering doubts (about the effectiveness of the
international treaty) and partisan politics (founded upon
outdated ideologies of national sovereignty) may again foreclose
the opportunity for the United States to lead a just and
thorough regime of international arms control. By closely
examining the U.S. Senate's previous rejection (and, by
implication, the nation's non-ratification) of the CTBT, we
assess the political process that failed to realize the security
values now imperative to U.S. national defense. To this
appraisal, we join analysis of the contemporary law, policy, and
science related to U.S. nuclear arms control policy; and we urge
that now is the time for the U.S. Senate to reconsider and give
its advice and consent for the ratification of the CTBT.
I. INTRODUCTION
"And so, to all the other peoples and governments who are
watching today .... know that America is a friend of each nation
and every man, woman[,] and child who seeks a future of peace
and dignity. And we are ready to lead once more."2
"With both sides of this divided world in possession of
unbelievably destructive weapons, mankind approaches a state
where mutual annihilation becomes a possibility. No other fact
of today's world equals this in importance. .. "3
If the complete eradication of nuclear weapons seems a
remote possibility, it is nonetheless important for wise policy
makers to consider such a goal in terms of the rational control
and regulation of nuclear arsenals by law. America's national
1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 [hereinafter
CTBT].
2. Barack H. Obama, President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/bloglinaugural-address/.
3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Annual Message to the Congress on the State
of the Union (Jan. 7, 1960), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/ speech
es/19600107%20State%20ofof20the%20Union.htm.
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discourse on foreign policy and security makes only fleeting
references to managing nuclear dangers through international
law.4 The tactical emphasis on a few rogue states appears to
obscure the strategic interest in a broader, more comprehensive,
and more effective approach to the problems of nuclear testing
and proliferation.5
The Bush Administration made clear its position on a
universal testing prohibition in 2001, when President Bush
announced that he would not submit the treaty to the Senate for
4. See Steven E. Miller, Until the Sun Grows Cold: Persisting Nuclear Dangers in a
Complacent World 28 (July 22-27, 2005), available at http://www.pugwash.org/
publication/op/feb2006.pdf ("In the decades since the end of World War II, the United
States has generally played an important global leadership role in promoting arms
control, international law, and international institutions. Now Washington seems to
have turned its back on that legacy .. "); see also Jonathan Medalia, Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, CRS Report RL34394, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 73 (2008) [hereinafter Issues and
Arguments] ("The 2005 [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] review
conference was widely seen as ending in failure. The United States focused on Iranian
and N. Korean nuclear issues, and on steps to counter proliferation, while, according to
one report, 'nonnuclear states insisted that the United States and other nuclear powers
focus on radically reducing their nuclear armaments,' and some wanted agreement on
the CTBT.").
5. BOB GRAHAM ET AL., WORLD AT RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM xx-xxi (2008) ("The United States
should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime,
reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by (1) imposing a range of
penalties for NPT violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of proof
to the state under review for noncompliance; (2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at
market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear [sic] states that agree not to develop
sensitive fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international obligations;
(3) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the
limitations to its safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the resources
and authorities needed to meet its current and expanding mandate; (4) promoting the
further development and effective implementation of counter-proliferation initiatives
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism; (5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran
and North Korea, possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capability;
(6) working in concert with others to do everything possible to promote and maintain a
moratorium on nuclear testing; (7) working toward a global agreement on the definition
of 'appropriate' and 'effective' nuclear security and accounting systems as legally
obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and (8) discouraging,
to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the promotion of civil nuclear
power.").
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advice and consent, declaring the document "fatally flawed."6 In
2002, a Department of Defense official stated, "We are
continuing the current administration policy, as I said, which is
we continue to oppose ratification of the CTBT; we continue to
adhere to a test moratorium."7 In 2007, the Administration
reaffirmed this stance. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
stated in a letter to a senator that, "the Administration does not
support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and does not
intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification.
There has been no change in the Administration's policy on this
matter."8
Excessive confidence in the deployment of limited tactical
assets (e.g., national intelligence), supplemented by direct
military confrontation, appears to have increased the dangers to
U.S. national security interests.9 Given the asymmetrical nature
of threats to U.S. security, the "Shock and Awe" force modello
6. See Deborah Charles, President Hopes Test-Ban Treaty Dies; An Aide Says the
Nuclear Pact is Flawed Because it Likely Cannot Be Verified, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 8, 2001, at All (noting that during his 2000 Campaign President Bush had called
the CTBT "fatally flawed.").
7. See J.D. Crouch, Assistant Sec'y of Def. for Int'l Sec. Policy, Special Briefing on
the Nuclear Posture Review (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/trascripts.aspx?trascriptid = 1 108.
8. See Jonathan Medalia, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background
and Current Developments, CRS Report RL33548, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4 (2008) [hereinafter Background] (citing Letter
from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Pete V. Domenici, Senator (June 25, 2007)).
9. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at xvi (explaining how the United States has
spent billions of dollars on counter proliferation measures during a new era of
proliferation by North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and the Middle East); id. at xv ("The
simple reality is that the risks that confront us today are evolving faster than our
multilayered responses. Many thousands of dedicated people across all agencies of our
government are working hard to protect this country, and their efforts have had a
positive impact. But the terrorists have been active [sic] too[,] [sic] and in our judgment
America's margin of safety is shrinking, not growing."); id. at vi (explaining that this
Commission was chartered by Congress to assess the nation's progress in preventing
WMD proliferation and terrorism, as well as to provide the President and Congress with
concrete, actionable recommendations that can serve as their road map to a safer
homeland and world).
10. Sue Chan, Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage, CBS NEWS, Jan. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/Ol/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml.
Harlan Ullman, one of the authors of the shock and awe concept, which relies on large
number of precision guided weapons, stated that "[tihe battle plan is based on a concept
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has proven to be expensive and ineffectual.11 The conventional
military approach has been unable to constrain alienated groups
of violent actors, often driven by confessional fanaticism.12
The real danger of asymmetrical threats is the possibility
that terrorist groups may acquire and seek to use weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear arsenals.13 The
gravity of this threat necessitates a broader, more
comprehensive approach to national security.14 Central to this
developed at the National Defense University. . . and it focuses on the psychological
destruction of the enemy's will to fight rather than the physical destruction of his
military forces. . . . So that you have this simultaneous effect, rather like the nuclear
weapons at Hiroshima, not taking days or weeks but in minutes." Id. See generally
NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007)
(providing for an in-depth perspective on the shock doctrine).
11. See HARLAN K. ULLMAN & JAMES P. WADE, SHOCK AND AWE: ACHIEVING RAPID
DOMINANCE 132 (1996) (explaining the prohibitive cost of using ballistic missiles in
large-scale operations).
12. GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at xvi-xvii (according to an April 2006 National
Intelligence Estimate on Trends in Global Terrorism, "'Activists identifying themselves
as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing both in number and
geographic dispersion. .... If this trend continues, threats to U.S. interests at home and
abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.' Since 9/11
there has been an increase in the number of groups that have associated or aligned
themselves with al Qaeda-the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States and the
perpetrators of 9/11-including al Qaeda in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,
and the Algerian al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC). This increase in terrorist networks is a threat to the
entire world.").
13. See Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and
Responses, CRS Report RL32595, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE 1 (2004); see also Amy Woolf, Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security
Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects, CRS Report RL34226, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 18 (2008); Mark Holt & Anthony Andrews, Nuclear
Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack, CRS Report RS21131, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (2007); Jonathan Medalia, Terrorist
"Dirty Bombs": A Brief Primer, CRS Report RS21528, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (2004).
14. GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at xvii ('Though U.S. policy and strategy have
made progress, they have not kept pace with the growing risks. In the area of
counterterrorism, our government has innovated and implemented new initiatives since
9/11, but its focus has been mainly limited to defense, intelligence, and homeland
security programs and operations. The next [Aidministration needs to go much further,
using the tools of 'soft power' to communicate effectively about American intentions and
to build grassroots social and economic institutions that will discourage radicalism and
undercut the terrorists in danger[ous] spots around the world--especially in Pakistan.');
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approach is the principle that the United States must lead, on a
bipartisan basis, on the issue of global arms control. More
specifically, a salient initiative remains-the control and
regulation of testing and deployment of nuclear arsenals. To the
extent that the law effectively regulates an important
component of this process, there is a timely need for the Senate
to revisit the pending status of the CTBT.
The CTBT evolved from negotiations that produced a
number of international legal initiatives concerning the control
and regulation of nuclear testing and the issue of nuclear
proliferation.15 One of the most important initiatives that
emerged from those concerns was the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).16 The NPT was an important international step toward
establishing control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons.17
In fulfillment of the continuing measures required by Article VI
of the NPT, the CTBT seeks to prevent the testing of nuclear
weapons by states wanting to create or augment nuclear
arsenals.
see also Rafael F. Perl, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and
Issues for Congress, CRS Report RL34230, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (2007) ("These [issues for Congress] include[:] (1) democratization
as a counterterrorism strategy; (2) the validity of the Strategy's assumptions about
terrorists; (3) whether the Strategy adequately addresses the situation in Iraq including
the U.S. presence there as a catalyst for international terrorism; (4) the Strategy's
effectiveness against rogue states; (5) the degree to which the Strategy addresses threats
reflected in recent National Intelligence Estimates; (6) mitigating extremist
indoctrination of the young; and (7) the efficacy of public diplomacy. To the degree that
the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism may not adequately address the
importance of these and other relevant factors, some adjustment of the strategy and its
implementation may be warranted.").
15. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 65 ("Efforts toward a CTBT date from
the dawn of the nuclear age."); see id. at 65-74 (providing for a detailed history of
nuclear testing, test bans, and nonproliferation).
16. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mar. 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
17. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining how the NPT
"represents a bargain in which nuclear weapon states could have nuclear weapons, non-
nuclear [sic] weapon states agreed not to acquire them, and both agreed, in Article VI, 'to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."').
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The Senate's rejection of the CTBT in 1999 sent an
inadvertent global message about nuclear weapons testing and
the role of the United States in arms control leadership. The
defeat of the Treaty by the world's most important super power
was a significant blow to the global effort of establishing a stable
system of control and regulation with the goal of completely
abolishing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the former chairperson
of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, the late
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, endeavored to certify
that the Treaty, now defeated, would remain defeated and un-
ratified by the United States.18 He commissioned the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress to
prepare a report entitled, Treaties and Other International
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate.19 Although
the scope of the report was very broad, it specifically addressed
the question of whether the Senate's defeat of the CTBT in 1999
assured that it was a juridically deceased instrument.20 Under
cover of a general review of the treaty law and practice of the
United States, the report concluded that the Senate's refusal to
ratify a treaty does not bar its revival for future ratification.21
Indeed, the report indicated that the Treaty remains within the
jurisdiction of the Senate, which has competence to reconsider
the matter in subsequent deliberation and action.22 Current
18. Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association, Holding the CTBT Hostage in the
Senate: The 'Stealth' Strategy of Helms and Lott, June-July 1998, http://www.arm
scontrol.org/print/374.
19. Cong. Research Serv., 106th Cong., Treaties and other International
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, S. Prt. No. 106-71, at iii (Comm.
Print 2001) [hereinafter Treaties and Other International Agreements].
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 144.
22. See id. at 433; see also id. (explaining how after the Senate rejected the CTBT
by a vote of 48-51, one present, on Oct. 13, 1999, "[tlhe Treaty reverted to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee at the end of the 106th Congress, where it remains
pending.").
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federal publications directly support this position.23 In short, the
Senate may in its political discretion and wisdom reconsider the
CTBT, should it so determine.
This article clarifies the current policy importance of the
CTBT-particularly in the context of responsible arms control
and the War on Terror24--and the unfortunate procedures
previously used to defeat the Treaty in the Senate. We
respectfully submit that severe flaws in the procedures leading
to its defeat subverted an important U.S. national security
interest. Using objective scholarly techniques, we articulate the
key issues, relevant history, political deficits, and the possibility
of a better national discourse with the new Obama
Administration. Our objective is to improve the political
prospects of the Senate's reconsideration of the CTBT using an
open and transparent process, which we hope to result in the
Senate giving its advice and consent.
The first part of our article describes the decision process
involved in negotiating the CTBT. During the Cold War, states
adopted numerous treaty-based agreements targeting nuclear
testing in response to environmental consequences that this
testing posed.25 The cross border pollution, dangers to human
health, and the perception of threat to global security created
the political will to attack the problem of testing nuclear
weapons.26
23. Background, supra note 8, at 1 (The CTBT "is on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's calendar. It would require a two-thirds Senate vote to send the treaty back
to the President for disposal or to give advice and consent for ratification.").
24. GEORGE W. BUSH, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 3 (2006)
("The War on Terror extends beyond the current armed conflict that arose out of the
attacks of September 11, 2001, and embraces all facets of continuing U.S. efforts to bring
an end to the scourge of terrorism.").
25. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, EVOLUTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN TREATY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS & GLOBAL SEC., 2009, http://www.ucsusa.orgt
nuclear weapons.and-global security/nuclear-weapons/policy-issues/evolution-of-
the.html (explaining how the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty "banned nuclear testing in
the atmosphere, in space, and under water... [which] addressed the most prominent
environmental concerns ... ").
26. See John F. Kennedy, President, Commencement Speech at American
University (June 10, 1963), available at http://wwwl.media.american.edu/
speeches[Kennedy.htm (describing the dangerous effects and explosive force of nuclear
weapons).
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The second part of this article outlines the political rise and
fall of the CTBT in the United States. It explores the role of the
key policymakers, the advantages and disadvantages of the
CTBT, and the real reasons for the defeat of the Treaty in the
Senate. To state it neutrally, "[t]he procedure by which the
treaty came to a vote was unusual, and influenced its
consideration."27 We agree with this assessment and assert that
the applied process lacked the firm guidance of a clarified
bipartisan national interest and that the Chairman's strategy
for defeating the Treaty was not in keeping with the traditions
of Senatorial process. We examine the political consequences of
the defeat of the CTBT and the prospect of the Senate's
reconsideration of this still pending treaty under the leadership
of a new Senate and a new Executive.
In part three, we give a historical description to the
international political consequences of the defeat of the CTBT.
In withholding advice and consent, the leading nuclear power of
the world sent a message of aggressive independence to the
target audience of adversaries around the world. It was
universally felt that the U.S. non-ratification of the CTBT
enhanced states' competitive and defensive global predisposition
to test and acquire nuclear arsenals.28 Foreign ministers and
heads of state of traditional U.S. allies expressed high criticism
of the defeat of the Treaty in the U.S. Senate.29 Absent U.S.
ratification of the CTBT, they argued, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty lost much of its effectiveness.30 Not only would states
27. Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 19, at 262.
28. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 73-74; See Barbara Crossette, Defeat of
a Treaty: The Shock Waves; Around the World, Dismay Over Senate Vote on Treaty, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al.
29. See David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Current
Legal Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 1007, 1027-28 (2007); see also Issues and Arguments, supra note
4, a 73-74 (explaining how fifty-nine foreign ministers in September 2006 called "'upon
all States that have no yet done so to sign and ratify the [CTBT] Treaty without delay, in
particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force." The United States
still has not ratified the Treaty, and it unilaterally opposes U.N. resolutions supporting
the Treaty.).
30. See Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 73-74 (stressing how ratification
from the United States is crucial for the CTBT to enter into force).
2009]
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find it easier to acquire nuclear technology and material, they
would now have an incentive to do s0.31 In short, if the United
States does not take the control and regulation of nuclear
arsenals seriously, why should lesser powers act with greater
restraint?
In part four, we emphasize the relevance of international
cooperation (via the CTBT in particular) to ongoing efforts to
fight the War on Terror. We urge the inclusion of specific
strategies within the foreign policy of the incoming presidential
Administration. This section also addresses several concerns we
anticipate opponents will argue regarding the effective
lawfulness of the CTBT on the U.S. government's strategic and
tactical posture.
The conclusion addresses important questions raised about
the U.S. national interest in ratification.32 Then we reframe the
issue in light of the fact that the CTBT has always been, and
still is, a vital component of America's national security posture
and international legal responsibilities.33 By good-faith
navigation of international standards, the United States would
legitimize external standards of world authority and cooperation
that alone have the ability to police the testing, creation and
proliferation of dangerous nuclear weapons.34 Moreover, by
31. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE CTBT (SHALIKASHVILI REPORT) 5 (2001), http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa--view&id=20248.
32. See Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 1 (significant questions include[:]
"Can the United States maintain deterrence without testing?" and "Are monitoring and
verification capability sufficient?" and "How might the treaty affect nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament?").
33. David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Current Legal
Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 1007, 1040 (2007) ("The United States is not currently required to
comply with the test ban per se, since that obligation would only attach upon entry into
force. But if the object and purpose of the CTBT could conceivably be located at a higher
level of abstraction, such as inhibiting the nuclear arms race or staving off the creation
of knowledge pertaining to new and potentially more dangerous nuclear weapons, with a
test ban as simply the method for accomplishing those overarching goals, then other
states could argue that the United States and other signatories are obligated to refrain
from testing even before EIF if such testing would help to develop new nuclear weapons
or new insight regarding existing types of weapons.").
34. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, supra note 31.
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accepting the role as global leader in disarmament, the United
States can exert greater influence over nuclear programs of
lesser nuclear powers and nuclear aspirants. The cumulative
effect of this article, we hope, will be to persuade decision-
makers that ratifying the CTBT is the national security priority
of our nation.
President Obama has promised to "work with the Senate to
secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date
and will then launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board other
states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter
into force."35 Unfortunately, this auspicious commitment does
not guarantee U.S. ratification of the CTBT.36 To that end, this
article recommends all citizens, parties and opinion-leaders
press for the reconsideration of the CTBT before the Senate. We
expect that the Senatorial leaders will seek to avoid the unusual
circumstances and possibly damaging precedent established in
the prior defeat of the CTBT. This will require a deliberate,
transparent, and informed process as well as public debate on
this national security priority.
II. PART ONE: WORK TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR
TEST BAN
The need for international cooperation regarding the
proliferation, testing, and use of nuclear weapons became
inescapably apparent after their first use in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in the waning days of World War 11.37 In August 1945,
the United States was the only global nuclear power.38 As the
other global power, the Soviet Union would have to compete
with the United States to achieve some form of parity in order to
35. Fact Sheet: Obama's New Plan to Confront 21st Century Threats, Obama
News & Speeches, July 16, 2008, http://www.barackobama.com/20O8/07/16/factsheet_
obamas new-plan to.php/.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the President to obtain the advice and
consent of the Senate by two-thirds majority vote before he may ratify treaties).
37. See, e.g., Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
Global Non-Proliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J., 408, 410
(1994).
38. Winston P. Nagan, Nuclear Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge
of the Millennium, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 485, 489 (Summer 1999).
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preserve its war gains and status (absorption of Eastern
Europe).39 It became the policy of the Soviet Union to match (or
supersede) U.S. nuclear capabilities.40
The Soviet Union and the United States embraced radically
different political and economic views,41 and each saw its
security, in part, in global expansion of its ideological outlook.42
This combination of factors led to the Cold War, which
generated the greatest arms race in history.43 During this
period, the Soviet and U.S. governments, aligned with their
ideological allies, developed and strengthened their respective
nuclear arsenals.44 They implemented comprehensive programs
of nuclear testing, with detonations occurring in the oceans,
land, and atmosphere.45
The United States and Britain tested their own nuclear
arsenals far from home. For example, during March of 1954, the
United States tested thermonuclear weapons in a number of
South Pacific Islands.46 These islands were a U.S. possession as
a trust from the United Nations.47 Since testing, they remain
uninhabitable.48
It was the physical and political fallout from this and similar
testing which energized international action for a ban on
39. See Erik Ringmar, The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West,
37(2) CooP. AND CONFLICT 115, 127 (2002) ("[W]hat the Soviet Union sought was
primarily neither expansion nor protection, but instead recognition as a country equal to
the undisputed leader, that is, the United States.").
40. See id. at 128 ("Instead, the Soviet quest for parity with the U[.]S[.] continued.
To this end they needed.., a nuclear weapons arsenal ... ").
41. See Harvey Rishikof & Patrick Bratton, Brave New World: U.S. Responses to
the Rise in International Crime, 50 VILL. L. REV. 655, 672 (2005).
42. Nagan, supra note 38.
43. Id. at 489.
44. Id. at 488-91; see also Angelique R. Kuchta, A Closer Look: The U.S. Senate's
Failure to Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 333, 339-40
(2001) (providing a concise timeline of historical events in nuclear testing).
45. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 32-33 (discussing various testing
methods and locations). In the 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union conducted
hundreds of hydrogen bomb tests. Id. at 1.
46. See Nagan, supra note 38, at 499.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 502.
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nuclear testing.49 The collective awareness of the dangers posed
by proliferation and unrestricted testing of nuclear weapons,
particularly their environmental consequences and threat to
human health, resulted in international agreements designed to
mitigate the dangers of living under the prospect of a nuclear
holocaust.50 To this day, nuclear arms control strategies focus
chiefly on nuclear testing prohibitions, which are a primary
means of limiting both horizontal and vertical proliferation of
nuclear arms.51
Negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban date as
far back as 1960, when the Eisenhower Administration proposed
such a nuclear test ban to the Soviet Union.52 However, the
politics of the Cold War prevented such an agreement.53 In any
49. CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, 1945-54 EARLY EFFORTS To RESTRAIN NUCLEAR
TESTING, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-1945-1993/1945-54early-efforts-torestra
in-nuclear-testing/page-3-1945-54early-efforts-to-restrain-nuclear-testing ("Debris from a
U[.]S[.] test near the Marshall Islands in March 1954 in the Pacific Ocean exposed the
crew of a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon. The thermonuclear device had
produced a yield significantly higher than was expected and resulted in increased
scrutiny of the effects of nuclear fallout.").
50. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 23 (July 8). The international community has unequivocally and consistently
reflected the attitude that nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to humanity and
civilization. Id. at 227. See also Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of The United
States Relating to International Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1998); Ambassador Thomas
Graham Jr., International Law and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 49, 49-50 (2000); Raven Winters, Preventing Repeat Offenders: North
Korea's Withdrawal and the Need for Revisions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1499, 1502 (2005).
51. David A. Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article
VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 WiS. L. REV. 301, 359 n.245 (1993).
'Testing has long been crucial to the development of nuclear weapons. Although it may
be theoretically possible for a country today to develop a crude atomic device without
conducting experimental explosions, the actual practice of countries has generally been
to test extensively prior to production or deployment of new nuclear arms. The
articulation of a test ban treaty, therefore, has long been appreciated as a key step
toward heading off the invention and dissemination of new forms of nuclear warheads."
Id. at 316-17.
52. See Kuchta, supra note 44, at 340.
53. See id. at 340-41 (discussing the economic, political, and military issues that
postponed an agreement). In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet Chairman
Nikolai Bulganin began a correspondence on nuclear test bans, which continued for
several years. 'The two nations were often deadlocked over on-site inspections, which the
United States claimed were needed to assure that the Soviets were not cheating and
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event, skepticism at the capability of verifying a state's
compliance with nuclear regulations was a major obstacle to
international cooperative efforts drafting an effective
instrument.54
The United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom
entered into the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (also
referred to as the "Limited Test Ban Treaty," or LTBT).55 The
LTBT was only a partial step, representing incomplete progress
toward the ultimate objective of a comprehensive test ban
treaty, which had eluded the negotiators due to a lack of
consensus concerning the applicable verification structures.56
Since the LTBT did not address nuclear testing underground, it
functioned better as an environmental protection measure (in
which the Soviets claimed were a means to introduce spies into the country." Issues and
Arguments, supra note 4, at 65; William J. Broad, U.S. Is Committed To Nuclear Tests,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1987, at Al; Nash, supra note 50, at 59 (observing that "the [CTBT]
represents the culmination of nearly four decades of efforts, beginning during the
Eisenhower Administration, to ban completely all nuclear weapon test explosions ...
wherever they might be carried out."); see Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and
Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear
Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 405, 448 (2003) (noting the lapse in time
between the negotiation of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1960 and the ratification of the
Nonproliferation Treaty in 1963). For a detailed history of the test ban negotiations from
1957 through 1963, see HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON & ERIC STEIN, DIPLOMATS,
SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
NEGOTIATIONS (1966).
54. See Jonas, supra note 33, at 1010.
55. Jack Mendelsohn, History and Evaluation of the Role of Nuclear Weapons in
the Cold War, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 609, 609-10 (1999); see also Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests].
56. See Koplow, supra note 51, at 318. Negotiations between the Soviet Union,
United Kingdom, and United States began in Moscow, when the Americans (highly
motivated in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis) finally compromised with the Soviets
to allow some form of nuclear testing. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 65. The
preamble to the LTBT declares that the original parties had been "[s]eeking to achieve
the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to
continue negotiations to this end .. "; see Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests, supra
note 55, 14 U.S.T. at 1316-17. Moreover, "the United States Secretary of State, upon
signing the accord, referred to the 'unfinished business' remaining to be accomplished."
Koplow, supra note 51, at 318 n.65.
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keeping radioactive debris out of the atmosphere) than as an
arms control device.57
The United States and Soviet Union negotiated two
subsequent treaties to address the deficiencies in prior nuclear
arms agreements. Both the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT)ss and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET) contain verification protocols.59 The TTBT limited
underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons (approximately
ten times the intensity of the Hiroshima blast).60 The PNET
extended the 150-kiloton limit to nuclear tests done for "peaceful
purposes."61
Apart from the negotiations between the two superpowers,
four regional groups of states formed international treaties
protecting their "regional nuclear-free zones."62 Among those
treaties were the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),63 the
Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,64 the 1985 South
57. "The first test ban agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, confined
only the location of nuclear tests, restricting the explosions to deep underground caverns
where the radioactivity and other products would be safely contained, not venting into
the biosphere." Id. at 317. "Because the Limited Test Ban Treaty did not outlaw nuclear
explosions underground, a comprehensive treaty was considered imperative by arms
control advocates." David Lenefsky, The Entry-Into-Force Provision of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty: An Example of Bad International Lawyering, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 255, 258 (1999).
58. Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974, 1714 U.N.T.S. 216.
59. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., May 28, 1976, 1714 U.N.T.S. 431.
60. See David A. Koplow, Bonehead Non-Proliferation, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
145, 147 (1993); Kuchta, supra note 44, at 341.
61. See Michael Rubner, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Post Cold War Era, 9
MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT'L L. 271, 272 (2000); Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions
for Peaceful Purposes, supra note 59, 1714 U.N.T.S. at 434.
62. Nagan, supra note 38, at 505; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 23 (July 8); see Bonnie Jenkins & Theodore M.
Hirsch, Arms Control and Development, 32 INT'L LAW. 427, 431-32 (1998).
63. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,
22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281.
64. Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, 1981
U.N.T.S. 130.
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Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,65 and the 1996 African
Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).66
The first major step toward controlling the proliferation of
nuclear weapons emerged in 1968 with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which the United States ratified (and
subsequently brought into force) in 1970.67 Signatories of the
NPT recognized that nuclear capabilities would not be
relinquished easily.68 Nevertheless, the proliferation and testing
of nuclear weapons presented a serious threat to humankind.69
There was a strong belief that all states should remain
committed to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.70 The
NPT confirmed that the responsibility of controlling the
proliferation, testing, use, and distribution of nuclear weapons
was properly the province of the international community.71
The NPT established the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), entrusting it to monitor member states, lest
non-nuclear states acquire nuclear weapons or the means to
make them.72 The NPT aimed to deter nonnuclear-weapon
states from acquiring nuclear weapons73 by banning all
members (except the United States, Britain, France, China, and
Russia) from possessing nuclear weapons.74 Thus, it divided the
65. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177.
66. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Sept. 13, 1995, 729 U.N.T.S. 10485.
67. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21
U.S.T. 483.
68. See generally id.
69. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T.
at 484.
70. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 23 at 265 (July 8). See also Winters, supra note 50, at 1500-02.
71. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT): BRIEF
BACKGROUND (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/nptreaty.html.
72. See Koplow, supra note 51, at 309 (illustrating that IAEA's monitoring process
includes on-site inspections and other intrusions to verify compliance with treaty
obligations); Graham Jr., supra note 50, at 52 (explaining how the International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguard system guards against the diversion of nuclear materials from
peaceful to war-making purposes); Winters, supra note 50, at 1501.
73. See Michael L. Freeley, Apocalypse Now? Resolving India's and Pakistan's
Testing Crisis, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 777, 786 (2000).
74. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T
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world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots."75 However, the NPT
committed these five nuclear-armed powers to negotiating a
comprehensive nuclear test ban, with the obligation of
eventually achieving complete nuclear disarmament.76
The Preamble to the NPT declares the signatories' desire to:
... further the easing of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States in order to
facilitate.., the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery
pursuant to a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international
control[.] ... 77
at 487; George Bunn, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current
Problems, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2003, www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-
12/Bunn.asp.
75. Certain states, notably India and Pakistan, have rejected the Non-Proliferation
Treaty as inherently unfair. See Freeley, supra note 73, at 800. By doing so, both India
and Pakistan were able to detonate numerous nuclear weapons in 1998, thereby
increasing tensions in the Kashmir region and showcasing their nuclear capabilities to
the world. Id. at 777. Today, the conflict between Pakistan and India continues to grow
and, as a result, the CTBT is seen by many as an essential safeguard in the
international movement to reduce hostility in Southeast Asia. Id. at 783-84, 801.
Because the CTBT binds all signatories in a same way, that is that all signatories agree
to the complete cessation of nuclear testing, states such as India and Pakistan will likely
be more inclined to ratify it. See id. at 801. It should be noted, however, that even if the
United States was to ratify the CTBT, Pakistan and India would still have several
reservations about signing the treaty. See id. at 788-89. Both India and Pakistan rely on
China's arsenal of nuclear weapons and China's refusal to ratify the CTBT as a
justification for their respective nuclear weapons programs. Id. at 790. Though far from
a complete resolution of the long standing conflict amongst China, Pakistan, and India,
it seems that U.S. ratification of the CTBT remains the first step in resolving the
contentious nuclear weapons issue in Southeast Asia. D. Suba Chandram, What If the
U.S. Ratifies the CTBT? Debating India's Options (July 31, 2009),
http://www.ipcs.orglarticle-details.php?articleNo=29 2 8. See also Koplow, supra note 51,
at 363 (noting that Pakistan and India have criticized the Non-Proliferation Treaty as
incomplete pending the CTBT); Lenefsky, supra note 57, at 258.
76. See Freeley, supra note 73, at 799.
77. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T
at 486.
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The Preamble recalls "the determination expressed by the
Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests ... to
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this
end.... ."78 In ratifying the NPT, parties to the Treaty were
"[d]eclaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake
effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament ... "79
Article VI provides that "[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control."80 Many negotiating states, such as
Germany, Sweden, Canada and Japan, believed that only a
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could realize the
objective of Article VI of the NPT.81 Such a treaty is the only
prospective arms control measure referred to in the Preamble of
the NPT.82
The NPT, however, makes continuous reference to the
development of nuclear technology for "peaceful purposes,"
creating what amounts to an exception to the non-proliferation
mandate of the NPT.83 Article IV of the NPT stipulates that it is
an "inalienable right" of states to develop nuclear research if
doing so is for peaceful purposes.84 The confusion generated by
such an exception is compounded by the ambiguity of its
78. Id.
79. Id. at 485.
80. Id. at 490; see Koplow, supra note 51, at 330-51 (discussing why the CTBT is
essential to achieving the objectives set forth in Article VI of the NPT).
81. See Koplow, supra note 60, at 150 (observing that "[d]uring the key stages of
the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the diplomatic representatives from
West Germany, Sweden, Canada, Japan[,] and other pivotal states were unambiguous in
asserting that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was the crucial 'effective measure' that
Article VI would mandate.").
82. Koplow, supra note 51, at 333.
83. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21
U.S.T at 489-90.
84. Id.
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terminology.85 The "peaceful purposes" exception may be a
byproduct of the ideas embodied in President Eisenhower's 1953
"Atoms for Peace" address to the U.N. General Assembly.s6 The
contemplated peaceful purpose of the drafters, of course, was the
development of nuclear energy.s7 The exception, however, grants
a state party an ostensibly legal basis for asserting its
inalienable right to develop nuclear technology.
This question has recently emerged regarding uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation programs of states
implicated in sponsoring asymmetrical conflicts.s8 Uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation does not violate the NPT
if done for peaceful purposes.89 Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are
a few of the states that have sought to develop nuclear arms by
85. Commentators have recognized the possibility of states being in technical
compliance with the NPT while actively pursuing uranium enrichment for the purposes
of developing a nuclear weapon. See David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the
"Final Four" Join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States
While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417, 424-25. It is one
of the most commonly addressed weaknesses of the NPT. Id. Marvin Miller, a research
affiliate at the MIT Center for International Studies and former director of Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency for Non-Proliferation and Regional Arms Control for the
Clinton Administration, observed that: "Although the NPT has been a major bulwark
against nuclear proliferation and has provided the legal and evidentiary basis for cases
of noncompliance, the Iranian and North Korean situations have underlined several of
its known deficiencies, in particular the ability of non-nuclear-weapon [sic] states-parties
to misuse Article IV to acquire weapons-relevant materials and technology, foil
verification attempts, and then withdraw from the treaty by invoking Article X." Marvin
Miller & Lawrence Scheinman, Israel, India, and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT
States in the Nonproliferation Regime, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2003,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act2003-12[MillerandScheinman.asp; see Cousineau, supra
note 37, at 422.
86. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Atoms for Peace, Address to the U.N.
General Assembly (Dec. 8, 1953), available at http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/
themes/internationallsafeguardingspeech.dot; Winters, supra note 50, at 1503.
87. Eisenhower, supra note 86.
88. The ability to enrich uranium is necessary for the development of both nuclear
energy and nuclear weapons. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, The Iranian Nuclear Threat:
Israel's Options Under International Law, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 55, 59 (2006). Enriched
uranium is uranium whose uranium-235 content has been increased through the process
of isotope separation. See Richard L. Williamson, Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening
the Nonproliferation Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
71, 78-79 (1995).
89. Bunn, supra note 74.
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representing to the world that their acquisition of nuclear
intelligence is for peaceful purposes.90 This exception for nuclear
energy development raises international concern, not only by
providing an escape to those states seeking to develop nuclear
arms under the veil of nuclear energy development, but also by
providing to the signatories of the NPT a justification for the
sale of nuclear intelligence to other states or groups.91
The possibility of abusing the ambiguity within the NPT is
obvious. This is an indication of the weakness of the NPT.92 For
90. See id. ("[T]he three countries where uranium enrichment or plutonium
separation was thought to have been conducted for weapons purposes-Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea-the activities had taken place largely at locations not declared open for
inspection to the IAEA."). Interview by Bernard Gwertzman with David Albright,
President, Institute for Science and International Security (Feb. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication18570/iran-may-achieve-capability_tomake-a nuclear_
weaponin 2009.html (recognizing that, if Iran continues to be able to test and develop
its nuclear technologies, Iran may be able to develop a nuclear weapon as soon as 2009).
Experts agree that a test ban would halt nuclear advances because the testing of nuclear
weapons is essential to the intelligent design and development of nuclear weapons. See
Broad, supra note 53, at 1; Winters, supra note 50, at 1502 (noting that Libya, a party to
the NPT, admitted in 2004 that it had sought to develop a nuclear weapon and that
other states, such as Iran, have been suspected of doing the same).
91. In the 1990s North Korea, while still a member of the NPT, acquired nuclear
technologies and information "under the guise" of nuclear testing. It then withdrew from
the NPT and developed a nuclear weapon. See Vejay Lalla, The Effectiveness of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: A Review of
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties and the Impact of the India and Pakistan Nuclear
Tests on the Non-Proliferation Regime, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 103, 117 (2000);
Freeley, supra note 73, at 786 (noting that the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides
"safeguards on peaceful nuclear exports"). Despite the peaceful purposes exception, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty continues to provide the world community with a justification
for questioning and investigating the nuclear facilities of states such as Libya and North
Korea. David Koplow, a Professor at Georgetown University, observed: 'Today, the NPT
is recognized as even more important than it was in 1968. It provides a fundamental
international lever for access to the otherwise-secret nuclear operations inside countries
such as Iraq, Libya[,] and North Korea. It secures a basis for inquiry and objection to
provocative nuclear collaboration with 'threshold' countries such as Brazil or India, even
when they remain outside the treaty itself." Koplow, supra note 60, at 152; see Jonas,
supra note 85, at 424 ("A very small minority of NPT member states, such as Iraq and
Iran, have shown a willingness to circumvent the mandates of the Treaty by actively
pursuing nuclear weapons programs even after accession to the Treaty."); Winters, supra
note 50, at 1505 (noting that the exception for peaceful purposes "actually provides a
way for non-nuclear [sic] states to initiate a process for building nuclear weapons[.]").
92. See Jonas, supra note 85, at 419.
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greater efficacy, the NPT needs a comprehensive test ban to
complement it.
In 1995, the parties to the NPT held a Review and Extension
Conference in New York to discuss whether the goals of the NPT
were being realized and whether the NPT should be extended.93
At the conference, the United States fought to extend the NPT
indefinitely.94 Other states (especially those banned from
obtaining nuclear arsenals) hesitated to extend the Treaty,
pointing out that the United States and other nuclear powers
did not seem to be working toward the international goal of
-nuclear disarmament.95 These states believed that parties to the
NPT had made a commitment to negotiate and adopt a
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.96 They viewed the
international community's failure to adopt such a treaty as a
blatant rejection of that commitment.97 Maintaining that the
five Nuclear Powers were not effectively pursuing their
commitments under the NPT, nonnuclear states opposed to an
extension of the NPT without a renewed commitment by the
93. 1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT (1995), http://www.basicint.org
nuclear/NPT/1997prepcom/principl.htm. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the NPT
establishes that review conferences are to be held every five years "in order to review the
operation of this Treaty with a view of assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and
the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T. at 491-92.
94. David Krieger, Senate Vote Leaves the World a More Dangerous Place (1999),
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1999/00/OOkriegersenate-vote.htm.
95. Id.
96. Id. The adoption of a comprehensive nuclear test ban was a topic at every
Review Conference held pursuant to Article VII of the NPT. Cousineau, supra note 37, at
417. The Review Conference held in 1985 affirmed that the language in Article VI of the
NPT called for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Id. ("[N]on-nuclear [sic] weapon states
criticize the nuclear-weapon states, especially the United States, for their failure to
adopt a comprehensive test ban agreement pursuant to Article VI of the N.P.T."); see also
Graham Jr., supra note 50, at 55 ("A significant number of key non-nuclear [sic] weapon
states were dissatisfied with the progress made by the nuclear weapon states in fulfilling
their Article VI side of the bargain."); Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 73
(explaining the need for '"nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of
their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are
committed under Article VI' of the NPT.").
97. See Krieger, supra note 94.
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nuclear powers to work toward the reduction of nuclear
proliferation and ultimately nuclear disarmament.98
To achieve its goal of extending the NPT indefinitely, the
United States and other States with nuclear weapons agreed to
a set of "Principles and Objectives" that included 'a universal
and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996."'99 The set of
Principles and Objectives outlined prospective steps that NPT
parties will undertake to achieve the disarmament goals of
Article VI of the NPT.100 Furthermore, the United States and
other states agreed to pursue progressive efforts to reduce
nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
those weapons.101 Ultimately, the NPT was extended
indefinitely from its initial twenty-five year term. 102
Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,
Switzerland, produced the CTBT,1o3 which the U.N. General
Assembly adopted in 1996.104 President Clinton signed the
CTBT in September of 1996.105 The President referred to the
CTBT as "[t]he longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in arms
98. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 72-73; Mendelsohn, supra note 55, at
610, 616 ("Th[e] [CTBT] has been considered quite understandably) by the non-nuclear
[sic] weapons states as a vital step toward fulfilling the commitment of the nuclear
powers to scale back their nuclear weapon arsenals and infrastructures.").
99. Krieger, supra note 94; see Jenkins & Hirsch, supra note 62, at 566-57 (noting
that the treaty was negotiated intensely during the 1996 Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, Switzerland); Mendelsohn, supra note 55, at 612; see also Jonas, supra note 85,
at 426-27; 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.basicint.orgtnuclear/NPT/1997prepcom/
principl.htm (illustrating the archives of the 1995 NPT conference).
100. Jonas, supra note 85, at 426-27.
101. Draft Decision Proposed by the President, 1995 Review and Extension
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (May 9, 1995),
available at http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/1997prepcom/principl.htm.
102. Jonas, supra note 85, at 421.
103. Jenkins & Hirsch, supra note 62, at 562; Kuchta, supra note 44, at 337.
104. CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1439.
105. Sean D. Murphy, Arms Control and Other National Security Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 137, 137 (2000); Nash, supra note 50, at 59.
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control history."106 It is considered by many states as furthering
the realization of the goals set out in the NPT.107
The CTBT proscribes all nuclear test explosions;10s it is a
necessary complement to the NPT.109 To date, 182 states have
signed the CTBT, including the United States.110 One hundred
fifty-one states have deposited an instrument of ratification.ill
The United States, though signing the CTBT in 1996, has yet to
ratify it.112 All NATO members, with the exception of the United
States, have ratified the CTBT.113 Of the five nuclear powers
that signed the NPT, only China and the United States have not
ratified the CTBT.114
In the United States, after the President negotiates and
signs the Treaty, the President normally sends a formal letter to
the Senate, which transmits the treaty for Senate action (advice
and consent by vote).115 If the Senate provides its advice and
106. William Clinton, President, Remarks by the President to the 52nd Session of
the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 22, 1997), http://www.state.gov/www/issues/
970922_clinton_unga.html.
107. Lalla, supra note 91, at 115 ("Many countries that participated in the 1995
NPT Review Conference urged that the CTBT be implemented as soon as possible to
supplement and strengthen the NPT.").
108. See CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1444.
109. Many of the current Treaty's signatories argue that the enactment of a
comprehensive test ban treaty remains vital to the future of the [NPT] and global non-
proliferation efforts. Koplow, supra note 51, at 330-31: Cousineau, supra note 37, at 420
("Proponents of... [the CTBT] contend that the states party to the N.P.T. originally
passed the Treaty with an implicit understanding that a comprehensive test ban would
follow shortly thereafter.").
110. See CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, STATUS OF SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION
(2010), http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/.
111. "The Marshall Islands has ratified the [CTBT], becoming the 151st country to
do so. The ratification of the CTBT by the Marshall Island is highly symbolic. A total of
67 atmospheric nuclear tests were conducted by the United States at the Bikini and
Enewetak Atolls between 1946 and 1958." CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, MARSHALL
ISLANDS RATIFIES COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (2009),
http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2009/marshall-islands-ratifies-
comprehensivenuclear-test-ban-treaty/.
112. See CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, supra note 111.
113. See id. (listing NATO and non-NATO countries that have ratified the CTBT).
114. Hewitson, supra note 53, at 451 (noting that China expressed "profound
regret" regarding the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT).
115. Masahiko Asado, CTBT" Legal Questions Arising from its Non-Entry-Into-
Force, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 85, 102 (2002).
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consent, the Treaty returns to the President, who must then
deposit an instrument of ratification with the United Nations.116
This final act indicates that the Treaty is a legally binding
obligation upon the United States.117 Thus, competence over a
treaty in the United States is a sequential competence,
beginning and ending with jurisdiction in the executive
branch.118
When the U.S. Senate voted 51-48 to decline to give its
advice and consent for the CTBT,119 it was the first time in
eighty years that the U.S. Senate had voted against an arms
control treaty.120 In general, the importance of nuclear policy
transcends partisan political lines. U.S. policy regarding nuclear
arms had been consistent since the early 1960s.121 This policy
committed the United States to working toward the ultimate
goal of nuclear disarmament, a goal shared by the international
community. 122
President Kennedy negotiated and signed the LTBT in the
early 1960s.123 These negotiations took place under both
116. See Jonas, supra note 33, at 1018-19.
117. See id. at 1028.
118. See generally Asado, supra note 115, at 102 ("Thus, in the United States, the
power seems to be with the President to make its intention clear to be or not to be a
party to a treaty.").
119. John R. Burroughs et al., Arms Control and National Security, 36 INT'L LAW.
471, 490 (2002).
120. See United States Senate, Rejected Treaties, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/commonlbriefing/Treaties.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2009)
(indicating that the Treaty of Versailles was voted against in 1919 and 1920). See Press
Release, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Senate Defeat Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with author) (explaining that the U.S. Senate last
defeated a treaty relevant to arms control when it voted down the Treaty of Versailles in
March 1920).
121. See Kuchta, supra note 44, at 340-43 (illustrating the history of U.S. policy
toward nuclear arms).
122. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 227-28 (July 8, 1996) (observing that the international community has
unequivocally and consistently reflected the attitude that nuclear weapons pose a grave
threat to humanity and civilization and that the international community should adopt a
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and work toward complete disarmament);
Nagan, supra note 38, at 506 (explaining that nuclear weapon-free zone regimes
represent vast people who desire the eradication of nuclear weapons).
123. See William Burr & Hector L. Montford, The Making of the Limited Test Ban
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President Eisenhower's Republican Administration and the
Democratic Administration of President Kennedy. 124 During the
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, Republicans and
Democrats were divided within their own parties regarding
whether the United States should adopt policy that would work
to proscribe, at least in part, the United States from testing of
nuclear weapons.125 Some believed testing is a necessary evil in
maintaining a superior U.S. nuclear arsenal; some supported
the Atomic Energy Commission's positionl26 that atmospheric
testing does not cause adverse health effects.127 Others favored
a comprehensive nuclear test ban.128
Negotiations leading up to the LTBT really centered around
global politics, specifically international concerns regarding
China's nuclear weapons program, nuclear proliferation, the
ability to monitor nuclear testing and verify compliance with a
test ban, and the humanitarian and environmental effects of
nuclear fallout from weapons testing.129 Both Eisenhower and
Kennedy viewed the 1963 Treaty as a bipartisan issue,130
recognizing the greater importance of realizing the United
State's ultimate goal of world nuclear disarmament.131 In an
Treaty, 1958-1963, THE NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE, Aug. 8, 2003, http://www.gwu.edui
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB94/ (explaining that the Geneva test ban negotiations,
which took place from late 1958 to early 1962, eventually led to the Kennedy
Administration "signing off on the first test ban treaty").
124. See id. (explaining that the test ban negotiations carried over from the
Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administration).
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. In a prophetic television address to the American people on July 26, 1963,
President Kennedy eloquently stated: "I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it
would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large
and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the
world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no
chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental
war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what
otherwise would be local conflicts." John F. Kennedy, President, Radio and Television
Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (July 26, 1963),
available at http://www.jfklibrary.orgHistorical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/
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address at American University on the CTBT, President
Kennedy stated:
The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this
Government since the 1920s [sic]. It has been urgently
sought by the past three [A]dministrations. And
however dim the prospects may be today, we intend to
continue this effort-to continue it in order that all
countries, including our own, can better grasp what the
problems and possibilities of disarmament are.132
The Reagan and Bush (1989-1993) Administrations resisted
both domestic and international pressures to negotiate a
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the belief that the
testing of nuclear weapons was essential for the United States
to maintain its superior arsenal as a means of deterring future
conflict. 133 Yet several arms control initiatives were launched. In
1992, President Bush (1989-1993) signed a legislative
amendment for an approximately one-year moratorium on
underground nuclear testing.134 The Bush Administration saw
the ratification of the LTBT and the PNET in 1990.135 The
United States also adopted the START I Treaty during
Speeches/JFK/Nuclear+Test+Ban+Treaty+Speech.htm.
132. John F. Kennedy, President, Address at American University on a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (June 10, 1963), available at
http://www 1.media.american.edu/speecheslKennedy.htm.
133. Cousineau, supra note 37, at 415 (noting that "The Clinton Administration
follows two Administrations that established a U.S. position against the formal
enactment of a comprehensive test ban and in favor of the overall goals of nuclear non-
proliferation."); Koplow, supra note 60, at 147-48; see Koplow, supra note 51, at 321-27
(describing the Reagan and Bush strategies designed to fend off international and
domestic pressure favoring testing limitations). The Reagan Administration's "official
Government position" was that a complete test ban would be appropriate "only when
there is no longer a need to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence." See Broad, supra
note 53, at 32. However, the Reagan Administration acknowledged that the "ultimate
objective" is 'the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective
disarmament process."' Id.
134. Kuchta, supra note 44, at 339; Broad, supra note 53, at 32; James Glanz,
Testing the Aging Stockpile in a Test Ban Era, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at Fl.
135. Rubner, supra note 61, at 272; Nash, supra note 50, at 60.
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President Bush's tenure.136 That Treaty limited the number of
nuclear tests that the United States and the Soviet Union (and
its successors) could conduct.137 The Clinton Administration re-
emphasized nuclear proliferation concerns and actively worked
toward nuclear disarmament goals. 138
Nuclear arms control continued to be a bipartisan issue
until 1999, when the U.S. Senate refused to give its advice and
consent to the ratification of the CTBT.139 Indeed, less than a
month prior to the hearings, the issue was widely viewed as
bipartisan. Senators Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and Arlen Specter
(R-PA) stated:
As Senators from different parties, we can say that such
a treaty has never been a partisan issue. Republican
President Dwight Eisenhower first proposed such a
treaty four decades ago. President Clinton recently
joined a bipartisan group of senators calling for Senate
hearings. Today, it enjoys the support from the current
Joint Chiefs of Staff, four former chairmen of the joint
chiefs and the directors of the three nuclear weapons
testing laboratories. 140
III. PART Two: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CTBT IN THE U.S.
SENATE
Since the discovery and exploitation of atomic energy
sources, a handful of states around the world have tested
nuclear arms to both develop new weapons and to assess the
reliability of existing ones. Assorted agreements and treaties
aimed to squelch the dangerous spread of nuclear arms, but
none proved exceedingly successful. The shortfalls of the NPT,
136. Rubner, supra note 61, at 272-73.
137. Id. at 273.
138. Cousineau, supra note 37, at 415-16; Rubner, supra note 61, at 276-77.
139. See Daryl Kimball, How the U.S. Senate Rejected CTBT Ratification, 40
Disarmament Diplomacy (Sept.-Oct. 1999), available at http://www.acronym.org.ukl
dd/dd40/40wrong.htm (explaining that on October 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate failed to
ratify the CTBT, rejecting it on a party-line vote of forty-eight for and fifty-one against,
with one senator voting "present").
140. Byron Dorgan & Arlen Specter, U.S. Wants, Needs Nuclear Test Ban Pact,
U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 13, 1999, at 27A.
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in particular, brought into focus the need for a more
comprehensive treaty that would control nuclear testing.
To that end, the United Nations unanimously approved a
resolution calling for negotiation of a CTBT.141 As the previous
section explained, the U.N. Conference on Disarmament spent
several years crafting a draft text of the Treaty; and the United
Nations adopted the text of the Treaty on September 10,
1996.142 This process represented the culmination of several
years of negotiation and drafting; thus, the CTBT has been
called the "longest-sought, hardest fought prize in the history of
arms control."143
President William Jefferson Clinton was the first head of
state to sign the CTBT, on September 24, 1996.144 One year
later, he transmitted the CTBT to the Senate for their advice
and consent.145 The President's letter of transmittal included
"safeguards" in order to make the CTBT more palatable to the
Senate.146 However, despite the assurances President Clinton
141. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 12.
142. Id. at 2.
143. U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 5th plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/52/PV.5
(Sept. 22, 1997).
144. President's Message to Senate Transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty and Documentation, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1390 (Aug. 25,
1997).
145. Id.
146. Jonas, supra note 33, at 1019. Those safeguards consisted of:
"A. The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to insure
a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in
the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and
continuing experimental programs. B. The maintenance of modern nuclear
laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear
technology that will attract, retain, and ensure [sic] the continuous
application of our human scientific resources to those program[s] on which
continued progress in nuclear technology depends. C. The maintenance of
the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT
should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this Treaty. D. The
continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to
improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations. E. The continued
development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical
capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development
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had taken care to attach to the Treaty, for several years it
gathered dust in the Senate, subject to the jurisdiction of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 147
In the month immediately following its transmission to the
Senate, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the
Senate Appropriations Committee held hearings on the United
States' ability to maintain nuclear weapons under a CTBT.148
However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was the only
committee of the Senate with jurisdiction to review and report to
the Senate on treaties submitted by the President for Senate
advice and consent to ratification. 149 Although President Clinton
continued to press the Senate to approve it, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Helms rejected that request,
saying that the treaty "from a non-proliferation standpoint, is
scarcely more than a sham" and had low priority for the
Committee.150
The Clinton Administration made serious representations to
get Helms to act. 151 While some have mentioned "anemic
programs, and related nuclear [sic] programs. F. The understanding that if
the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)-advised by the Nuclear Weapons
Council, the Directors of DOEs nuclear weapons laboratories, and the
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command-that a high level of confidence
in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two
Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be
certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to
withdraw from the CTBT under the standard 'supreme national interests'
clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required."
Press Release, Statement by the President, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(Aug. 11, 1995) (on file with the Office of the Press Secretary).
147. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 245
(Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS]. In 1998 and most of 1999, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not hold hearings dedicated to the treaty, did
not report the Treaty out, nor did the committee discharge the CTBT from consideration.
Id. at 263-64.
148. FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 147, at 262-63.
149. Id. at 263.
150. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 2.
151. "Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, once the
President has submitted a treaty for the advice and consent of the Senate, the treaty is
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." Jonas, supra note 33, at 1045. "It
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efforts"152 from the Executive, it is on the record that President
Clinton persistently urged Senators to pass the CTBT in his
1998153 and 1999154 State of the Union Addresses. In multiple
speeches from the White House, the President sought to bring a
then remains on the Committee calendar until the Committee acts to report it to the full
Senate or suggests that it be returned to the President, or the Senate discharges the
treaty from the Committee." Id. (quoting RULES OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 109TH CONG., 1st Sess., S-PRT 109-11 (Feb. 1, 2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109-cong-senate-Committee
_prints&docid =f:98278.wais).
152. Their chief concern being nuclear espionage, Charles Ferguson (a former Los
Alamos National Laboratory research scientist and a senior research analyst with the
Federation of American Scientists) and Daryl Kimball (the executive director of the
Washington, D.C.-based Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers) wrote a news piece in
June 1999 expressing strong criticism of the Clinton Administration for its inability to
pass the Treaty through the ratification process with the Senate's approval. Charles
Ferguson & Daryl Kimball, Test Ban Treaty is Last Line of Defense Against Nuclear
Espionage, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, June 4, 1999.
[Tihe President thus far has failed to act on his promise to make the treaty a
priority and to capitalize on the overwhelming public support, the
endorsement of military leaders, and strong Senate backing for the Test Ban
Treaty, which would win the two-thirds majority needed for ratification if a
vote were allowed. The Clinton Administration must bolster its anemic
efforts to press for Senate approval if the United States is to ratify this year.
Id.
153. In his 1998 State of the Union Address, President Clinton specially mentioned
the CTBT.
I ask Congress to join me in pursuing an ambitious agenda to reduce the
serious threat of weapons of mass destruction. This year, four decades after
it was first proposed by President Eisenhower, a Comprehensive Test Ban is
within reach. By ending nuclear testing, we can help to prevent the
development of new and more dangerous weapons, and make it more
difficult for non-nuclear [sic] states to build them.
I am pleased to announce that four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff-Generals John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell and David Jones, and
Admiral William Crowe-have endorsed this treaty, and I ask the Senate to
approve it this year.
Press Release, Department of State, President Asks for Senate to Approve CTBT This
Year (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/
test-ban-news/tbn04.html.
154. "It's been two years since I signed the ... Treaty. If we don't do the right
thing, other nations won't either. I ask the Senate to . . . [a]pprove the Treaty now, to
make it harder for other nations to develop nuclear arms and to make sure we can end
nuclear testing .. " Bill Clinton, President, 1999 State of the Union Address (Jan. 19,
1999), available at http://www.cnn.comIALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/01/19/sotu tra
nscript/.
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sense of the U.S. leadership and international responsibility to
the leadership of the Senate.155 Moreover, President Clinton
forcefully targeted Congress in a speech he delivered before the
United Nations in 1999.156
When the Senate failed to act on the Treaty for two years,
frustrations began to mount. Democratic Senators became
perturbed, prompting some to lash out at the Republican
leadership for being "utterly irresponsible" in their failure to
consider the CTBT. 157 Despite Democratic protestations158 and
Presidential exhortations, 159 the Treaty lingered in the Senate
155. See Working Group on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, President,
Secretary of State Call on Senate to Set Example, Vote on CTBT, TEST BAN NEWS,
June 5, 1998, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/news/tbn21.htm
[hereinafter TEST BAN NEWS] ('Two years ago, I was the first to sign this treaty at the
United Nation[s] on behalf of the United States. The present situation in South Asia
makes it all the more important that the Senate debate and vote on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty without delay. The CTBT will strengthen our ability to detect and to
deter testing. If we are calling on other nations to act responsibly, America must set the
example.").
156. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President to the
54th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, (Sept. 21 1999), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New /html19990921_l.html ("And today again, I ask our
Congress to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.").
157. Senator Joseph Biden, for example, said, "[i]t is high time that the Republican
leadership of this body agreed to schedule Senate debate and a vote on ratification. It is
utterly irresponsible for the Republican leadership to hold this treaty hostage to other
issues, as it has for two years." 145 CONG. REC. S11426 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1999)
(statement by Sen. Joseph Biden).
158. One letter from Senator Biden (co-authored by Republican Senator Arlen
Spector) to his colleagues in the Senate, reveals a swelling impatience:
We write to ask for your co-sponsorship of a Sense of the Senate Resolution
that the Foreign Relations Committee should hold a hearing or hearings on
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and that the Senate should
take up the treaty for debate and vote on ratification as expeditiously as
possible. Failure by the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty may give
rise to an inference that the United States government is not serious about
banning nuclear testing and may, in effect, encourage or at least not
discourage such testing.
Presbyterian Church (USA), U.S. Must lead on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
https://www.pcusa.org/washington/issuenet/gs-000850.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009)
(explaining that the 149 countries have signed the CTBT and "many look to the U.S. for
leadership on the issue.").
159. See TEST BAN NEWS, supra note 155 ("President Clinton and Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright urged the Senate to act quickly on the Comprehensive Nuclear
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without action in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.160
Democrats agitated for hearings.161 In fact, some Democrats
threatened to obstruct the Senate calendar if the Republicans
refused to permit the consideration of the Treaty. 162 Completely
blind to certain tactically secretive political maneuverings, the
Democrats believed that they would persuade as many as
twenty-five Republicans to vote to approve the CTBT.163
As it were, the prolonged inaction of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations had been the intentional result of political
maneuvering by Senator Jesse Helms. Senator Helms
Test-Ban Treaty"). Again, in a Rose Garden speech in July of 1999, President Clinton
urged Senate Republicans to:
Hold hearings this fall. Hearings would allow each side to make its case for
and against the treaty, and allow the Senate to decide this matter on the
merits. We have a chance right now to end nuclear testing forever. It would
be a tragedy for our security and for our children's future to let this
opportunity slip away.
Press Release, Department of State, Statement by the President (July 23, 1999),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/test-ban _news/tbn35.html.
160. See FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 147, at 262-63 (describing the procedure
by which the treaty came to a vote).
161. Id.
162. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) articulated that he would be resorting to
extreme measures if the Senate continued to refuse to consider the CTBT. 145 CONG.
REC. 115, S10541 (Statement by Sen. Byron Dorgan on Sept. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/resources/ctbtdorganl.htm.
I am sorry if I am going to cause some problems around here with the
schedule. But frankly, as I said, there are big issues and there are small
issues. This [the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] is a big
issue. And I am flat tired of seeing small issues around this Chamber every
day in every way, when the big issues are bottled up in some committee and
the key is held by one or two people. Then we are told: If you do not like it,
tough luck; you don't run this place. It is true, I don't run this place, but
those who do should know this is going to be a tough place to run if you do
not decide to bring this issue to the floor of the Senate and give us the
opportunity to debate a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This will
not be an easy road ahead for the Senate if you decide that this country shall
not exercise the moral leadership that is our responsibility on these matters.
Id.
163. John M. Broder, Quietly and Dexterously, Senate Republicans Set a Trap, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A16. Nor did observers outside of politics foresee the outcome. In
their (incorrect) estimation, highly ranked scientists believed that the Treaty would be
greeted with a "strong Senate backing [and] would win the two-thirds majority needed
for ratification." Ferguson & Kimball, supra note 152.
[Vol. 32:1
CTBT & National Security
personally repudiated the wisdom of U.S. leadership in arms
control.164 Implacably opposed to the CTBT, the Senator, using
his bottleneck position of power, acting along with a small group
of senators, including Senator Jon Kyl, engineered the defeat of
the CTBT.165
"Since last winter [of 1998]," reported the New York Times,
... a handful of Republicans led by Senator Jon Kyl of
Arizona had been secretly proselytizing their fellow
members about the treaty and accumulating committed
votes against it. They enlisted several former top
Administration officials who opposed the treaty,
including James R. Schlesinger, a former Secretary of
Defense, and retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, a former
national security adviser, to help sway their colleagues.
In May, Mr. Kyl told Mr. Lott he had 34 firm
Republican votes against the treaty, meaning that
advocates of the treaty could not reach the two-thirds
majority needed to ratify it. Mr. Lott reported the news
to Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, an ardent foe of the nuclear
testing agreement, and suggested that Mr. Helms could
safely release the treaty for a quick rejection on the
Senate floor.
Mr. Helms said, "Get me more," according to an aide.
"He wanted the treaty finished, dead, with no chance of
revival," the aide said. Mr. Kyl continued quietly
rounding up opponents. 166
It is clear that a group of right-wing Senators had, for many
months, silently secured the "no" votes of some of their
colleagues and quietly passed the information along to the
organizer of the scheme, Senator Helms.167 Knowing that there
164. See WILLIAM LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF
MODERN CONSERVATISM 459-60 (St. Martin's Press 2008) (stating that in Oct. 1999,
Helms abruptly shifted tactics by agreeing to an immediate vote on the treaty).
165. See id. (describing Helms' delay tactics).
166. Broder, supra note 163.
167. See FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 147, at 263 ("Senators Kyl and Coverdell
had arranged for briefings of other Republican Senators to make the case against the
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would be enough votes to prevent the necessary two-thirds
majority for ratification, Senator Helms was now confident that,
in releasing the CTBT for a vote, he had more than the one-third
necessary to defeat the Treaty-even amidst increasing pressure
from the other side of the aisle.168
Senator Helms suddenly reversed his public position and
addressed the CTBT.169 He arranged for the critical, fast-track
vote. 170 This abrupt change in course triggered his covert plan to
kill the Treaty, a result he willfully secured in a non-
transparent manner designed to subvert the democratic
process. 171
A speedy vote would result in a speedy execution of the
instrument. Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
agreed on September 30, 1999 to allow ten hours of debate prior
to a vote on the CTBT.172 With the unanimous consent of the
Senate, Senator Lott released the CTBT to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for consideration. 173
'There was a frustration with the failure to get this
treaty considered, a legitimate frustration,' said
treaty, and by September 30 had lined up 42 votes against it. On that day, Senator Lott
responded to demands to consider the treaty. He asked for unanimous consent to
discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of the
treaty on October 6, to begin consideration of the treaty on that day, with a total of 10
hours of debate, and then to vote on the resolution of ratification. Senator Daschle
objected to the request on grounds that it proposed to hold the vote too quickly, did not
allow enough time for debate, and assumed the treaty would be defeated. Under the final
agreement, the Senate began consideration of the treaty on October 8. Each leader was
permitted one amendment to the resolution of ratification, with 8 hours of debate
permitted on the two amendments and 14 hours on the resolution of ratification. The
Senate would then proceed to a vote.").
168. See LINK, supra note 164, at 460-61.
169. Id. at 460 (stating that in October 1999, Helms abruptly shifted tactics by
agreeing to an immediate vote on the treaty).
170. See FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 147, and accompanying text.
171. See LINK, supra note 164, at 460-61 (describing Helms' change in tactics that
"spelled the treaty's doom.").
172. Eric Schmitt, Senate G.O.P. to Allow Vote on Pact to Ban Nuclear Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at As.
173. 145 CONG. REC. Sll, 819-21 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Trent
Lott).
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Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan.174 He
acknowledged that Democratic impatience gave Mr.
Lott all the excuse he needed to call for a quick vote on
the treaty.175. .. 'They put us in a position of looking
like we didn't want the treaty to come up if we opposed
that kind of extremely rapid consideration,' Senator
Levin said. 176
With enviable speed, both the Arms Services Committee and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled truncated
hearings.177
The complete reversal of Republican priorities surprised the
Democrats.178 The Democrats realized belatedly that there were
not enough votes to secure the approval in the Senate.179 They
began a campaign to forestall voting on the Treaty. 180 The White
House was also blindsided by speed with which the hearings
were scheduled.1s1 In fact, it did not have enough time to
organize the presentations from the Administration's
perspective in support of the Treaty.182 The abnormally short
period within which to prepare for the hearings and bring in
appropriate experts insured the hearings were set up in such a
way as to be perfunctory.183 The complete merits of both
174. Broder, supra note 163, at A16.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; Richard F. Grimmett, Overview of the Treaty Process, in TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, SEN.
COMM. PRINT. 106-71, 1, 4, 264 (Richard F. Grimmett ed., Jan. 2001).
178. See Broder, supra note 163, at A16 (stating that "[Senator] Biden and other
Democrats were ignorant of the deeply rooted Republican opposition to the treaty," and
were only partly aware of what was happening behind the scenes in the Republican
caucus).
179. See id. (stating that the Democratic Senators had not "adequately] .. .
gaug[ed] the sentiment in the Senate").
180. Id.
181. Grimmett, supra note 177, at 262-65. President Clinton asked Senator Lott to
defer consideration, in order to gain time for presenting the Administration's position.
Id.
182. Broder, supra note 163, at A16.
183. See Grimmett, supra note 177, at 264 (stating that, "on average .... other
such agreements received much more consideration").
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arguments, for and against the CTBT, never made it before the
Senate.184 Neither the Senate nor the American people received
a legitimate opportunity to consider the Treaty.
"By the time the debate began, all recognized that the treaty
would be defeated."185 The hasty consideration and vote troubled
individuals on both sides of the party lines.186 "Accordingly,
Senators Moynihan and Warner gathered sixty-two signatures-
twenty-four Republicans and thirty-eight Democrats-for a
letter to Senators Lott and Daschle requesting that the vote be
deferred."187 Notwithstanding considerable requests to delay the
vote, the Senate debated the CTBT on October 8th, 12th, and
13th.188
"Several hearings [had been] held the week before, by the
Foreign Relations Committee on October 7, and by the Armed
Services committee on October 5, 6, and 7."189 The Armed
Services Committee was the first to hear testimony on the CTBT
on October 5th, 6th, and 7th, 1999; and various experts
represented both sides of the debate. 190 However, the main focus
184. See id. (stating that both parties were "troubled by the hasty consideration
and vote." ).
185. Id. at 264.
186. Id.
The Senate debate also addressed the question of whether the Senate had
given the treaty adequate consideration in the form of hearings and floor
debate. Senator Helms stated that the CTBT was 'extensively discussed' in
14 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in 1998 and 1999, while
Senator Daschle presented a list, "Senate Consideration of Major Arms
Control and Security Treaties-1972-1999," showing, on average, that other
such agreements received much more consideration than did the CTBT.
Senator Byrd stated that the process for considering this treaty was
inadequate. "To accept or reject this treaty on the basis of such flimsy
understanding of the details as most of us possess," he said, "is a blot on the
integrity of the Senate, and a disservice to the Nation." As a result, he
declared he would vote "present" for the first time in his 41 years as a
Senator.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. On Oct. 6, The Senate Armed Services Committee heard testimony from
Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
William Shelton, who both agreed that the CTBT would help reduce the evils associated
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of the hearings was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It
was in this Committee's leadership that we find subversion of
the public interest.
The Foreign Relations Committee scheduled one day for the
hearings.191 The Committee started with comments from those
opposed to the Treaty. Criticism focused on alleged weaknesses
of verification and stock-pile stewardship concerns.192 After the
lunch recess, the proponents of the Treaty were given an
opportunity to testify.193 Senator Biden and Secretary of State
Albright spoke in favor of the Treaty.194 That was the extent of
endorsement that the time-limited Democrats were able to
provide. 195
Throughout the day, Senators generally debated the
effectiveness of the CTBT.
.. Senators debated whether the treaty would advance
nuclear nonproliferation objectives, whether other
nations could conduct clandestine tests of military
significance, and whether the United States could
maintain its nuclear deterrent without nuclear tests. 196
Some also raised the question of how the international
community might react to U.S. rejection of the treaty,
with proliferation, and while not perfect, would reduce the nuclear threat to the United
States. National Security Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Before the
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense, and General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff),
available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/1999/c991006.htm. James
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, also testified before the Armed Services
Committee and stressed the risk that the CTBT would pose to the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Panels 11 and III of a Hearing Before the Senate
Armed Services Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of James Schlesinger, Defense
Secretary) [hereinafter Panels].
191. Grimmett, supra note 177, at 264.
192. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby).
193. Panels, supra note 190.
194. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden and Madeleine K
Albright, Secretary of State).
195. See id. (representing the only records which show endorsements by
democrats).
196. Grimmett, supra note 177, at 264.
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and whether rejection would undermine the U.S.
leadership role in the world and lead to the unraveling
of other arms control agreements.197
The complete hearing on the CTBT in the Foreign Relations
Committee took less than eight hours.198
Senator Helms successfully held a minimalist hearing
designed to meet the barest procedural requirements.
Notwithstanding the superficial nature of the hearing, the
Foreign Relations Committee sent the vote to the Senate
floor.199 "When the floor debate was concluded, fifty-one
Republican Senators voted down the [CTBT] in the face of
international pressure, the opposition of the White House, and
hostile media."200
Senators opposed to the CTBT had made three principal
arguments. First, they argued that the CTBT is not sufficiently
verifiable, because, as the argument went, "if we cannot detect
another state's nuclear test, then they could be perfecting their
nuclear program while ours stays stagnant."201 Second, the
opponents argued that the United States could not be good
stewards of an already-existing nuclear stockpile without
additional physical nuclear testing.202 Finally, the Treaty's
opponents denied the basic expectation that U.S. ratification of
the CTBT would serve as an incentive for other states to join the
Treaty.203
These criticisms (which remain pertinent today and receive
attention below) formed the ostensible justification of individual
197. Id.
198. See Final Review of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-28):
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (1999), available at
http://www.fas.orglnukelcontrolctbttextictbtsenate.htm (showing that the hearing took
place from 10:35 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. with a one-hour lunch recess).
199. Panels, supra note 190.
200. Richard Lowry, Test-Ban Ban, NAT'L REVIEW, Nov. 8, 1999, reprinted in 145
CONG. REC. 29, 477-78 (1999).
201. Panels, supra note 190 (noting that "we cannot be absolutely certain of
detecting low-yield threats").
202. Id. (reflecting Senator Smith's concerns that the Treaty would not provide
"verification" and "credibility" offered by testing).
203. Id.
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Senators whose votes sustained the highly partisan agenda of
the extreme right wing of the Senate. Nevertheless, based on
then-contemporary responses put forth to these criticisms, it is
unclear why individual Senators would vote against an
instrument as important to U.S. national security as the CTBT.
Thus, the positions of the opposing Senators left many rational
third party appraisers far from convinced.204 Background facts
support the finding that the decision to reject the Treaty was
made prior to and outside of the formal hearings.
Prior to signing the CTBT, President Clinton had refused to
sign and transmit to the Senate the Republican-favored ABM
and Chemical Weapons Treaty.205 This may have generated
vengeful motivation. Additionally, Senator Helms and his right
wing acolytes remained bitter over President Clinton's victory in
the impeachment trial eight months earlier.206 Senator Helms
thus scored an important political point. He would deprive
President Clinton of an important political legacy.207 The
ratification of the CTBT could have been seen as an important
victory for the Democrats over a critical national security issue.
Such a victory would have been a political asset to a Democratic
Presidential candidate. The conclusion is inescapable: the
Senate defeated the Treaty on a basis of a highly politicized
agenda, dominated by partisan concerns of electoral advantages
versus the national common interest.
Leaders of the United States' most important allies wrote a
strong plea to the U.S. Senate to ratify the CTBT.208 Published
204. See Barbara Crossette, World Leaders React With Dismay to Rejection of
Treaty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1999, at International, available at
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/global11599treaty-react.html (noting the
rejection of the treaty by the Senate was "interpreted by many diplomats and editorial
writers abroad as a direct slap on the fact of American allies and friends").
205. WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF
MODERN CONSERVATISM 459-63 (2008).
206. Id. at 443-44.
207. 'The Senate action was a particularly sharp repudiation of Mr. Clinton
because he had sold the treaty as a national security imperative for the United States."
Broder, supra note 163, at A16.
208. 'The United States and its allies have worked side by side for a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the days of President Eisenhower. This goal is
now within our grasp. Our security is involved, as well as America's. For the security of
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in the New York Times, Prime Minister Tony Blair, President
Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder collaborated
in an unprecedented op-ed, imploring the Senate to ratify the
Treaty. 209 They warned of the consequences of U.S.
isolationism; "[r]ejection of the Treaty in the Senate would
remove the pressure from other states still hesitating about
whether to ratify it" and would give "encouragement to
proliferators."210 International leaders also emphasized that the
Senate's defeat of the Treaty would undermine the NPT, the
cornerstone of global nuclear safety.211 Their representations
were ignored by Senator Helms and his allies.212
IV. PART THREE: POLITICAL FALLOUT OF THE REJECTION OF THE
CTBT
Immediately following the vote, diplomacy took a back seat
when foreign ministers and heads of state around the world
openly criticized the United States for its failure.213 The
the world we will leave to our children, we urge the United States Senate to ratify the
treaty." Jacques Chirac et al., Op-Ed., A Treaty We All Need, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at
A27.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. ("Failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a failure in
our struggle against proliferation. The stabilizing effect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
extended in 1995, would be undermined. Disarmament negotiations would suffer.").
212. See Broder, supra note 163, at A16 (according to Helms' aide, he wanted the
treaty "finished, dead, with no chance of revival").
213. See Craig Cerniello, Russia, China, US. Allies Condemn Senate Defeat of
Treaty, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (describing how "[t]he Senate's
rejection of the [CTBT] ... drew a barrage of criticism from Russia and China, as well as
from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia"); see also Barbara Crossette, Defeat of a Treaty: The
Shock Waves; Around the World, Dismay Over Senate Vote on Treaty, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1999, at Al (quoting the disappointment of foreign ministers and defense
ministers from around the world); The ACRONYM INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT
DIPLOMACY, SENATE REJECTION OF THE CTBT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS AND
COMMENT, http://www.acronym.org.uk/ctbt/ctbreac2.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009)
(expressing statements of regret and disappointment from governments around the
world) [hereinafter THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE]; U.S. Information Agency, Office of
Research and Media Reaction, CTBT" The U.S.' "Dangerous Hesitance" Imperils
Nonproliferation Regime, Oct. 13, 1999, http://www.fas.orgtnuke/control/ctbt/news/
wwwh9ol3.htm (statements from various governments expressing regret at the failure of
the U.S. Senate to pass the CTBT); Burroughs et al., supra note 119, at 491 n.101 (a
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Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, joining the neighboring
Philippine Foreign Secretary, stressed his country's
disappointment with the United States' lack of leadership and
labeled the adverse effects "inestimable."214 Russia, which
maintains the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world,215
expressed its disappointment through Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Vladimir Rackhmanin. The Spokesperson stated
that "[tlhis decision is a serious blow to the entire system of
agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation."216 China, considered to be one of the greatest
nuclear threats to the United States, said it "deeply regrets" the
Senate's rejection.217
sampling of expressed concerns from around the world).
214. Cerniello, supra note 213. 'The situation should be deemed serious .... Since
Japan has expected U.S. leadership toward nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation throughout the world, this outcome is indeed regrettable." Press Release,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono on the
Refusal by the U.S. Senate to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) (Oct. 14, 1999), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/10/1014-2.html.
The Mayor of Hiroshima said "[The United States is] going against international efforts
to reduce nuclear arms .... As a nuclear power, the U.S. should lead the way to end the
proliferation of nuclear weapons." Asia Dismayed by U.S. Treaty Vote, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ONLINE, Oct. 14, 1999. "Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon called the
United States vote 'an enormous blow to all our efforts to make the world a safer place to
live in."' Cerniello, supra note 213.
215. Cerniello, supra note 213; Russia: An American Olive Branch, STRATFOR,
Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_russiaamericanolive-branch.
216. THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE, supra note 213 (citing Russia Concerned By U.S.
Senate Nuclear Vote, REUTERS, Oct. 14, 1999). The Spokesperson continued: 'We express
our disappointment and serious concern in connection with the rejection of the treaty by
the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Administration worked very actively on all stages of its
development and was first to sign it .... There is a definite trend visible in recent times
in U.S. actions and it causes deep alarm." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Igor D.
Sergeev, Assistant to President Putin on Strategic Stability, "linked disruption of the
CTBT to a weakening of the NPT and ABM, which would stimulate proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction." Senator Douglas Roche, "Precious But Fleeting" Report on
the November 2001 Conference on Facilitating the Entry-Into-Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, THE PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR, Dec. 2001, http:/www.
ploughshares.caflibraries/monitor/mondOlg.html.
217. THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE, supra note 213 (citing China to Speed Up CTBT
Ratification, REUTERS, Oct. 14, 1999). "China deeply regrets that the U.S. Senate voted
to reject the ratification . ..The United States, as one of the 44 countries whose
ratification is required for the enforcement of the treaty, has great influence on bringing
the pact into force." Id.
2009]
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even the United States' traditional and most loyal allies
lamented the decision. France found the Senate's refusal to
ratify antithetical to the fight against proliferation and stated
that, "[t]he decision will affect the credibility of the United
State's [sic] role in this domain."218 German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer said he was "deeply disappointed." 219 The
defense minister echoed his disappointment, calling it the
"absolutely wrong decision."220
Canada's foreign minister voiced the paradoxical nature of
the act, saying that "[a] world accustomed to U.S. leadership in
the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament can only be
deeply disturbed by this turn of events, which will be welcomed
by those who remain uncommitted to that cause."221 On a
supranational level, both NATO and the EU voiced their
concern; Secretary General George Robertson called the Senate
action "very worrying"222 and Foreign Affairs Minister for the
EU Louis Michel expressed the EU's regret over the act and the
hope that the United States would reconsider.223
Dating back to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the
United States has been the leader on the international stage for
disarmament.224 The Senate's cavalier act was a sharp reversal
218. Id. "France is but the more determined to assume its responsibilities, as it has
done so far, as a responsible nuclear power resolved to maintain strategic stability." Id.
219. Cerniello, supra note 213 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE, supra note 213.
222. Cerniello, supra note 213. "[Ilt's a very worrying vote... [.] I think it has a lot
to do with the partisan nature of American politics at the moment and the sort of febrile
atmosphere that comes with a Presidential election on the horizon." THE ACRONYM
INSTITUTE, supra note 213 (alteration in original) (citing Global Dismay at U.S. Senate
Nuclear Ban Rejection, REUTERS, Oct. 14, 1999).
223. Louis Michel, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Belgium, Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (Nov. 11, 2001), available at http://www.un.orglwebcast/ctbt/
statements/belgiumE.htm. "[W]e can only regret the United States' announcement that
it will cease to participate in certain activities arising from the Treaty and that it does
not plan to reconsider its position on ratification." Id.
224. See President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before the General Assembly of
the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Dec. 8, 1953), available at
http://www.iaea.org/About/history-speech.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (pledging the
United States' "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma"); President John
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of this trend and signaled to the world that the United States
appeared to abdicate its leadership, compromising the thirty-
five plus year international process of disarmament and non-
proliferation. To some states seeking to develop nuclear
arsenals, this was a welcome surprise.225 One analyst for the
burgeoning nuclear power India commented that India "can just
relax now," anticipating the Treaty to be dead;226 and Japan's
Vice Minister commented that "Japan may be better off if it
arms itself with nuclear weapons."227
The defeat of the CTBT on the Senate floor sent
repercussions around the globe. World opinion found a united
voice, overwhelmingly condemning the vote and calling on the
United States to take the lead in ratifying the CTBT.228 As one
of four Republican senators voting in favor of the Treaty, Arlen
Specter prophetically spoke to his colleagues, "[this] will be a
vote heard around the world to the detriment of the United
States."229
In order for the CTBT to enter into force, forty-four of the
States' Parties listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty must deposit their
instruments of ratification with the U.N. Secretary-General.23o
F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (Sept. 25, 1961), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/
Archives/Reference+DesklSpeeches/JFK/Nuclear+Test+Ban+Treaty+Speechhtm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2009) ("we in the United States have labored ... to find an approach to
disarmament which would be so far-reaching, yet realistic, so mutually balanced and
beneficial, that it could be accepted by every nation.").
225. Joseph Cirincione, U.S. Senate Rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty and the Possibly Deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, Nov. 1999,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ npp/publications/index.cfm?fa--view&id=136. An
analyst at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi was "delighted with the Senate
vote." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 'To enter into force . . .the Treaty must be signed and ratified by the 44
States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. These States participated in the negotiations of
the Treaty in 1996 and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at the time. Thirty-
five of these States have ratified the Treaty, including the three nuclear weapon States
France, Russian Federation and the United Kingdom." Press Release, Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Org. Preparatory Comm'n, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
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With thirty-five of these Annex 2 states having already ratified
the CTBT, only nine states remain: China, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
Pakistan, and the United States.231 Aside from the United
States, three major holdouts remain; China,232 India, and
Pakistan,233 all of which have suggested that they will not ratify
Signs Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (July 2, 2009), http:lwww.ctbto.org/
press-centre/press-releases/2009/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadinessigns-cmprehensive-
nuclear-test-ban-treaty/; Burroughs et al., supra note 119, at 493; Kuchta, supra note 44,
at 338. Some scholars have attributed India and Pakistan's failure to sign or ratify the
treaty to the nuclear powers' failure to effectively work toward the disarmament goals
outlined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and United States' failure to ratify the CTBT.
See, e.g., Freeley, supra note 73, at 789-90 (stating that "India and Pakistan argue that
the nuclear powers have ignored disarmament language found in the NPT and LTBT,
and will not sign the [CTBT] unless more concrete steps toward global disarmament are
pursued); Lalla, supra note 91, at 104-05.
231. Press Release, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Org. Preparatory
Comm'n, Progress in the Middle East: Lebanon Ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (Nov. 25 2008), http:lwww.ctbto.orglpress-centrelpress-releases/
2008/progress-in-the-middle-east-lebanonratifies-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-
treaty/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
232. Sidney D. Drell, The Shadow of the Bomb, 136 POLICY REVIEW 55, 63 (2006),
available at http://www.policyreview.org/136/drell.html; "China ha[s] indicated they will
work to bring the treaty into force once the United States has ratified it." Sidney Drell,
et al., A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation, 33 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 8, 10 (2003), available at http:/www.armscontrol.org/print/1210 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009); American Foreign Press, China Assures U.N. of Ratifying CTBT
Soon, DAWN (Pakistan), Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.dawn.com
2003/09105int7.htm ('We will see a Chinese ratification, rather sooner tha[n] later,'
[Wolfgang Hoffman] said 'To ratify they need a broad consensus[.] . . .I feel that this
broad consensus is evolving."'). China has conducted thirty-nine tests and "[t]he Chinese
government reportedly wrote to the U.N. Secretary-General . . . [that] 'after a
comprehensive test ban treaty is concluded and comes into effect, China will abide by it
and carry out no more nuclear tests."' JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 4-5 (2000). In a white
paper of December 2004, China stated its support for early entry into force and their
continued commitment to the test moratorium until that is accomplished. STATE
COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE IN 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html.
233. See Freeley, supra note 73, at 786; Lalla, supra note 91, at 104; Rebecca
Johnson & Daryl Kimball, Who Needs the Nuclear Test Ban?, THE ACRONYM INSTITUTE,
DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, July-Aug. 2001, available at http://www.acronym.org.ukl
dd/dd59/59ctbt.htm. India, Pakistan, and China have all declared voluntary
moratoriums on testing, and Pakistan and India have said that the "signature of the
CTBT awaits the development of a 'consensus' for such action." Id.
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the Treaty until the United States completes its own
ratification.234
All U.S. allies through NATO have signed and ratified the
CTBT.235 Historical U.S. adversaries such as Russia, Japan, and
Vietnam also ratified the Treaty.236 Indeed, as of March 2010, of
the 195 states recognized worldwide by the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission), a total of 182
states have signed the CTBT; and 151 states have ratified the
CTBT in total.237 Only thirteen states in the world have yet to
sign the CTBT; and only forty-four states in the world have not
ratified.238 The defeat of the CTBT in the Senate commenced a
disappointing hiatus in stymieing the proliferation and testing
of nuclear weapons. The cost of parochial, ideologically-driven
politics was a less secure world.
Nevertheless, the CTBT is not dead juridically.239 President
234. See Jofi Joseph, Renew the Drive for CTBT Ratification, WASH. QUARTERLY,
Apr. 2009, at 80 (suggesting that the United States' failure to ratify the CTBT provides
an excuse for China, India and Pakistan to avoid ratification as well).
235. Compare NATO Member Countries [hereinafter NATO Members],
http://www.nato.int/ps.ennatolive/natocountries.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009), with
Status of Signature and Ratification [hereinafter CTBT Status], http://www.ctbto.org/
the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). The NATO
alliance currently consists of twenty-six independent member countries, including
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and
the United States. NATO Members, http://www.nato.intcps/enlnatolive/nato_
countries.htm. All NATO members have signed the CTBT. CTBT Status,
http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification.
236. CTBT Status, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-
ratification (noting the signature and ratification dates of those countries).
237. Id.
238. Id. The forty-six states that have not ratified the Treaty are Angola, Bhutan,
Brunei Darussalam, the Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Niue, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu,
United States of America, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Id.
239. "At the end of the 106th Congress, pursuant to Senate Rule XXX, paragraph
2, the treaty moved to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calendar, where it
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Clinton predicted on the day following its defeat in the Senate:
"When all is said and done, I have no doubt that the United
States will ratify this Treaty."240 Senator Helms authorized a
report of the entire treaty-making process in the Senate in order
to determine whether the defeat of the Treaty meant that it was
dead forever.241 Yet Appendix 9 of that report indicates that the
CTBT reverted to the status of a pending treaty.242 It is
therefore still within the custody of the Senate.243 Since it is
within the custody of the Senate, it is well within the rules and
practices of the Senate that the Senate may reconsider a vote on
any matter if it is still within its custody.244 Having the
legitimate authority to do so, a new Senate-guided by the
Obama Administration's strong, nonpartisan leadership-owes
the American people full and fair hearings and debate in order
to assess the CTBT's value for the national security interests of
the American people.
V. PART FOUR: INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AS A COMPONENT FOR
STRONG NATIONAL SECURITY
You [military professionals] must know something
about strategy and tactics and logic-logistics, but also
currently resides." Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 3.
240. President Bill Clinton, News Conference, reprinted in Defeat of a Treaty;
Clinton at News Conference: 'Troubling Signs of New Isolationism', N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com11999/10/15/world/defeat-treaty-
clinton-conference-troubling-signs-new-isolationism.html?pagewanted=l.
241. See Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 19, at iii
(referencing Senator Helms' request for the study entitled "Treaties and Other
International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate" to be updated).
242. Id. at 433.
243. Id. at 143.
If a treaty fails to receive the two-thirds vote necessary for Senate advice and
consent, the Executive Clerk normally prepares a resolution for Senate
approval reporting that fact to the President. Unless the Senate acts
affirmatively by resolution to return a rejected treaty to the President,
however, that treaty is returned to the Senate's Executive Calendar. Then,
in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule XXX, it automatically is referred
back to the Foreign Relations Committee at the conclusion of the Congress.
Id.
244. See Rules of the Senate, Rule XXX, Executive Session-Proceedings on
Treaties, para.2, http://rules.senate.gov/public.
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economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You
must know everything you can know about military
power, and you must also understand the limits of
military power. You must understand that few of the
important problems of our time have. .. been finally
solved by military power alone.
- President John F. Kennedy. 245
Even with the power to reconsider the Treaty, why should
the United States ratify the CTBT now? Research institutes,
analysts, policy makers, and politicians have all arrived at the
same conclusions: ratification of the CTBT by the United States
will guarantee its lead in nuclear technology and will prevent
other states from developing nuclear weapons.246 The
advantages of ratifying are inextricably linked with the
consequences of failing to ratify.247 Without a centralized and
agreed upon international policing security force, and without a
legally enforceable CTBT, we run the risk of creating a critical
security legal vacuum, which will doubtless be filled by state
and non-state actors holding aggressive, destructive objectives
for themselves in the international system.248
245. Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class of the United States Naval
Academy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 232 (June 7, 1961).
246. Global Beat: Military, Scientific Leader and the American People Want Test
Ban Treaty, http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/CRND091799.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2009) (listing supporters of the CTBT as: a majority of American people, U.S.
Presidents, Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former military and
diplomatic leaders, former United States Senators, key U.S. allies and nuclear weapon
scientists, and leading scientific and professional organizations).
247. "The CTBT is a vital disarmament and nonproliferation instrument. By
prohibiting all nuclear test explosions it impedes the ability of states possessing nuclear
weapons to field new and more deadly types of warheads, while also helping to prevent
the emergence of new nuclear-armed states." Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., The
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 2009 NATIONAL SECURITY AND
NONPROLIFERATION BRIEFING BOOK 21, 22 (2008).
248. Because the terrorist networks scheming to attack the United States are
global, "our response must be global as well. We need redoubled intelligence and police
cooperation around the world to find and defeat terrorist groups with nuclear
ambitions." Matthew Bunn & Andrew Newman, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, reprinted
in 2009 NATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION BRIEFING BOOK 30 (Charles
Ferguson ed., 2008).
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Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara warned in
Foreign Policy that America's continuation of the current
nuclear policy (non-ratification) will not only lead to substantial
proliferation of nuclear weapon in states such as Egypt, Japan,
Saudi Arabia and Syria but will also facilitate the improvement
of nuclear arsenals in states that are already members of the
nuclear club.249 Meanwhile, non-state terrorist groups have
demonstrated that they are ruthless and, should they acquire
materials sufficient to create any sort of device, they will seek to
use the device against U.S. interests.250
In order to ensure that states having weapons will place
them in deep-freeze (upon finding that they are not worth the
risks they entail to themselves), and to address the prospect of
uncontrolled proliferation, the strategic approach of a new
national security doctrine must deploy a broad toolkit
containing both coercive and persuasive strategies and
tactics.251 A flexible approach requires the deft use of diplomatic
strategies touching upon the wide range of cultural, educational,
enterprisory, humanitarian, and intelligence-sharing initiatives
that broaden the points of common interest between the United
States and such states.252 Nevertheless, a flexible approach
requires a backbone. The backbone of U.S. foreign policy
249. Robert S. McNamara, Apocalypse Soon, FOREIGN POLICY, May-June 2005, at
34-35, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.comlstory.cms.php?story-id=2829; Jimmy
Carter, A Dangerous Deal With India, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, at A19.
250. "A report of June 2004 by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States found that even though an attempt by al Qaeda in 1994 to purchase
uranium failed, 'al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining a
nuclear weapon."' AMY L. FITZGERALD, TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (Nova
Science Publishers) (Aug. 2, 2006).
251. 'There is an urgent need to rebalance our foreign policy and national security
toolkit, restructure the institutions and processes, and provide adequate funding for the
civilian instruments of power." Former Government Official Who Prefers to Remain
Anonymous, Rebalancing and Reorganizing the Government to Better Address National
Security Challenges, in 2009 NATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION BRIEFING
BOOK 3, 4 (Aura Kanegis ed., 2008) [hereinafter Former Government Official].
252. See id. (describing the lack of flow in the sharing of terrorist-related
information between and among federal, state, and local government and private sector
partners and the need for coordination between the agencies in regards to funding,
leadership and accountability).
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requires an effective design of international law to ensure global
security and stability.253
At present, the United States has one of the most advanced,
powerful, and effectively deployed nuclear arms posture in the
world.254 It is an awesome strategic arsenal. The aggregate
power inherent in it could destroy any enemy. It is a power that
requires responsible and wise stewardship. It mandates
collective governing responsibility and an appropriate degree of
transparency and accountability to the people of the United
States. U.S. tax-paying citizens have funded and authorized the
technological developments and achievements in this field.255 It
is appropriate for these citizens to be informed participants in
the shared responsibilities of national security in our democratic
society.256
In the global context, a limited number of states maintain
nuclear arsenals.257 This limitation is largely a result of
important developments in international agreement-making,
international law, and a shared global responsibility on a matter
of global importance.258 The most important collective
253. See BOB GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at xx-xxi (recommending that the
"United States should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation
regime" through international treaties and nonproliferation organizations).
254. Federation of American Scientists, Status of World Nuclear Forces,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009).
255. Stephen I. Schwartz & Deepti Choubey, Nuclear Security Spending.- Assessing
Costs, Examining Priorities, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jan. 2009,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22601.
256. We echo these opening remarks: 'Though our recommendations are primarily
addressed to the next President and the next Congress, we also envision an important
role for citizens. We want to inform our fellow citizens, and thereby empower them to
act. We call for a new emphasis on open and honest engagement between government
and citizens in safeguarding our homeland and in becoming knowledgeable about and
developing coordinated public responses to potential terrorist attacks." GRAHAM ET AL.,
supra note 5, at xiii.
257. Union of Concerned Scientists, Worldwide-Nuclear-Arsenals-Fact-Sheet,
http://www.ucsusa.orglassets/documentsnwgs[Wordwide-Nuclear-Arsenals-Fact-
Sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (stating that the United States and Russia
maintain 96% of the world's nuclear weapons).
258. See Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, United Nations, art. I, Nov. 1996, 35
I.L.M. 1439; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations,
Mar. 1970, http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html.
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agreement is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). The NPT has not stopped proliferation, but it
has had a constraining effect on it.259 It narrows the problem to
a few states and challenges U.S. policy makers to design skilled
strategic policies and practices to cooperate with allied states
that have acquired nuclear arsenals and possibly delivery
systems.260
Russia has replaced the USSR as the United States' historic
nuclear adversary.261 The United States must consider seriously
Russia's emerging security doctrine, needs, and interests in
order to diminish the nuclear threat to both states.262 Chinese
nuclear capabilities confront Russia on its border. In addition,
Russia is geographically close to tense regions in the Middle
East and South Asia and may harbor genuine fears of becoming
an indirect victim of escalating conflicts. It is clear that, without
reinventing a Cold War with Russia, we must generate or
reaffirm understandings about the testing, deployment and
strategic uses of nuclear arsenals. Bilateral agreements do not
resolve all the problems between the major nuclear powers, but
they establish a framework of better-known expectations and
benchmarks for serious diplomatic communication and
259. Jim Walsh, Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-
Proliferation (2005), http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/no41.pdf.
260. See McNamara, supra note 249.
261. See posting of Ed Corcoran to SitRep, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles
090421301-strategic-nuclear-targets.htm (Apr. 21, 2009) (arguing that, after the fall of
the Soviet Union, "US and Russian nuclear forces remained frozen in adversarial
positions.").
262. Medalia, supra note 13, at i ('The nations of greatest concern as potential
sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan.
Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, which tend to be lower in yield but more
dispersed and apparently less secure than strategic weapons. It also has much highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate
security. Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without
state support, fabricate a nuclear bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether
terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium."); GRAHAM, ET AL., supra note 5, at xvi
("Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has spent billions of dollars securing
nuclear weapons, materials, and technology in Russia and the former states of the Soviet
Union . . . . But during that period, the world has also witnessed a new era of
proliferation . . . If not constrained, this proliferation could prompt nuclear crises and
even nuclear use at the very time that the United States and Russia are trying to reduce
their nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles.").
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collaboration on matters of mutual concern.
The world's lesser nuclear powers include allies like the
United Kingdom, France, Israel, India and South Africa (which
has given up its arsenal).263 It is imperative that the United
States work collaboratively with these traditional allies on the
issue of arms control and its particular focus on nuclear
arsenals. The United Kingdom and France, as members of
NATO, offer reliable cooperation as a major component of shared
security interests.
"The views of such key countries as Brazil, Egypt, Japan,
South Africa,264 and others should be sought on the importance
ascribed to deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals and
to CTBT ratification, as well as their response to an initiative to
begin negotiations for a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons
by a date certain."265
The United States has fraternal and economic ties with
nuclear-enabled China and Pakistan.266 The United States
simultaneously engages in tense relationships with North Korea
and Iran (a potential nuclear power).267 U.S. relations with most
263. See Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 257; People's daily online-
U.S. Urges Iran to follow S. Africa's nuclear example, http://english.people.com.cnl
200608/251eng20060825_- 296661.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
264. A network of states around which disarmament policies are formulated and
promoted should certainly include South Africa. South Africa is the nuclear power that
has given up nuclear weapons but has not diminished in its status within the framework
of world peace and security. South Africa is an example to be encouraged. See AMIR
FRAYMAN, IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL
(International Institute for Counter-Terrorism) (2005) ("Nuclear disarmament
symbolized South Africa's shift from a nuclear power to a state committed to
international conventions, and one that undertakes decisive efforts to curb the
development and distribution of weapons of mass destruction, thus gaining a place of
honor among the nations of the world.").
265. See Barry M. Blechman, Moving to a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, in 2009
NATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION BRIEFING BOOK 7, 10 PEACE AND SECURITY
INSTITUTE (2008) (urging the new Administration to begin soundings on the priorities of
the non-weapon states at the preparatory conference in May 2009 in order to avoid a
confrontation at the review conference in 2010).
266. Fact Sheet Creation of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,
Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releass/hpl7.htm.
267. Ivan Oelrich, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge, in 2009 NATIONAL
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION BRIEFING BOOK 53-54 (Peace and Security Initiative
2008) (describing the concern the United States has over the North Korean nuclear
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of the lesser nuclear powers should enhance cooperation via
important access points-politically, economically,
educationally, and culturally-in order to reduce the possible
threat these states may pose to the United States and
themselves, as well as the world community.
Although they exist in regions of volatility and pose threats
of unpredictable deployments and accidental nuclear
engagement, the greater danger with states like Pakistan and
North Korea is the possibility that they may be lax about the
trade in nuclear technologies and materials or that there may be
some slippage in the security of their arsenals.268 In Pakistan,
for example, the presence of terrorist groups adds to the dangers
posed by nuclear slippage.269 Such groups may well acquire
nuclear hardware and be able to make crude devices with which
to attack the United States and its allies.270 Thus, instability in
this region provides a serious threat to global security;
connecting asymmetrical terrorism to nuclear capacity and the
clandestine ability to opportunistically deploy and use for
terrorist purposes.
One of the urgent tasks of a new administration should be a
strenuous effort, bilaterally and multilaterally, to secure
weapons program).
268. GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at xvi ("Since the end of the Cold War, the
United States has spent billions of dollars securing nuclear weapons, materials, and
technology in Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union-to good effect-and has
introduced some new counter-proliferation measures. But during that period, the world
has also witnessed a new era of proliferation: North Korea tested a nuclear weapon; Iran
has been rapidly developing capabilities that will enable it to build nuclear weapons; Dr.
A. Q. Khan, of Pakistan, led a nuclear proliferation network that was a one-stop shop for
aspiring nuclear weapons countries; and nuclear arms rivalries have intensified in the
Middle East and Asia.").
269. Medalia, supra note 13, at i ("The fear regarding Pakistan is that some
members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if
President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state
of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon. Terrorists might also
obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as
fuel.").
270. For detailed discussion of diplomatic efforts to secure nuclear weapons
material, see CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by
Sharon Squassoni; CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,
by Larry Niksch; and CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for
India and Pakistan, by Sharon Squassoni.
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maximum cooperation with all governments and associations of
governments in policing global terrorism. The War on Terrorism
has dramatically impacted the direction of U.S. foreign policy-
especially strategic and tactical operations for securing U.S.
objectives.271 Under the Bush Doctrine, the United States
formulated a policy that indicates that the United States will
hold responsible any sovereign state that has aided and abetted
the terrorists in the acquisition of WMD and their use against
U.S. interests.272 While the application of this doctrine to Iraq
proved to be based on fictitious intelligence, the Bush Doctrine
may have to be carefully evaluated in terms of the appropriate
boundaries in international law.
The Obama Administration, for example, inherits wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan and a "long-term struggle with [a]l Qaeda
and its affiliates, while facing the possibility of another nuclear
weapons state in Iran."273 The international legitimacy of U.S.
preemption in these instances derives from the implicit efforts of
President Bush to reframe the boundaries of sovereignty and
security.274 Unfortunately, President Bush has not adequately
271. See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375 (2004) [hereinafter Bush
National Security Doctrine].
272. Wade Boese, Bush Administration Releases Strategy on WMD Threat, ARMS
CONTROL ASS'N., Jan./Feb. 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-01-02/wmds
trategyjanfeb03 (detailing the Bush Administration WMD Policy).
273. PEACE & SECURITY INITIATIVE, 2009 NATIONAL SECURITY AND
NONPROLIFERATION BRIEFING BOOK 1 (2008).
274. Bush National Security Doctrine, supra note 271, at 380-81 ("Prior to
October 7, 2001-when the United States began bombing Afghanistan-the invasion of
Afghanistan staked a claim to more than mere self-defense. In general terms, it was a
claim to intervene and change a state's composition in the international constitutional
system. This claim required an expansive interpretation of the right to self-defense in
situations where the enemy is not a state, but a significant group of terrorists within a
state. American officials and decision-makers who sought to solve the Afghanistan
problem inflated the principle of self-defense so that international law would not be
constrained by matters of temporal limitation, such as the imminence of future attacks
or the need for immediacy required to repel an actual attack. The inevitable corollary
envisioned a regime change in Afghanistan to replace the Taliban, which was a
surrogate for terrorist interests. This relies on a notion that conflates the Taliban regime
and the terrorists' interests, manifesting the concept of a 'terrorist state' with only a
patina of legitimate sovereignty. Thus, the Afghanistan intervention could be justified by
the interesting principle that a regime sufficiently implicated in terrorism, in the
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developed a reconciliation of the boundaries of legitimate
international law, with the problem of global terrorism
regarding the effective and appropriate reach of preventive
strategies in the War Against Terrorism.275 In short, the
ambitious Bush Doctrine claims too much, with too little hard-
nosed legal analysis to support it. The Obama Administration
may moderate or correct these legal deficits in
international/national law.
Underlying the Bush Doctrine is the complicated and
inadequately developed notion of a unitary presidency, which
protection of terrorist operatives, and unrepentant about the culture of terrorism within
its borders may justify an invasion of the primary 'terrorist state' by a primary 'victim
state' of terrorism. The specific purpose of the Afghanistan intervention was to remove
all of its "terrorist state" characteristics and replace them with a new conception of
statehood and sovereignty more consistent with these themes as defined by the U.N.
Charter."); Bush National Security Doctrine, supra note 271, 380-81. See generally id.
(addressing the problem of international constitutional law pertaining to the
permissibility of altering the constitutional system of state sovereigns).
275. On September 5, 2006, the White House released the 2006 National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism, which provides a framework for protecting the United States
and its allies from terrorist attacks. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COMBATING TERRORISM (2006). "Core components of the Strategy are to disrupt and
disable terrorist networks across the globe, and foster international cooperation in these
efforts. Creating a global intolerance of terrorism is central as well. The 2006 Strategy
differs from the 2003 version primarily in that it sets different priorities for the strategic
elements designed to achieve its goals. Perhaps most significant of these differences is a
major increase in emphasis on democratization as a method of combating terrorism.
Additionally, the 2006 strategy places greater emphasis on denying terrorists sanctuary
in underdeveloped, failed, and rogue states. The use of economic and political tools to
strengthen nations vulnerable to the spread of terrorist influence appears to receive less
emphasis in the 2006 Strategy than in the 2003 version." Perl, supra note 14, at 1-2
(examining the 2006 National Strategy in the context of its predecessor in 2003, and
identifying issues and options for consideration by Congress). To the degree that the
2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism does not adequately address the
importance of these and other relevant factors, Perl recommends some adjustment of the
strategy and its implementation. See id. (numbering issues inherent to the National
Strategy, including: (1) democratization as a counterterrorism strategy; (2) the validity
of the Strategy's assumptions about terrorists; (3) whether the Strategy adequately
addresses the situation in Iraq including the U.S. presence there as a catalyst for
international terrorism; (4) the Strategy's effectiveness against rogue states; (5) the
degree to which the Strategy addresses threats reflected in recent National Intelligence
Estimates; (6) mitigating extremist indoctrination of the young; and (7) the efficacy of
public diplomacy).
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has vast implications for the rule of law.276 More helpfully, the
Bush Doctrine also developed the notion of a "rogue state."277
Regrettably, while it may still be a useful international legal
principle as a qualification on the idea of sovereignty, it has lost
substantial credibility since later intelligence on Iraq's WMD
revealed that the President's anticipatory attack on a so-called
"rogue state" was used in the wrong place, in the wrong war, at
the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.278 Nevertheless,
while its value has dissipated in terms of international
cooperation, the "Abuse of Sovereignty" idea may have
substantial currency as part of a new national security doctrine
for the United States.279 International security may well be
276. In assessing the legally binding aspects of the Bush Doctrine, consider that
"[i]nternational law makes no distinction between treaties and executive agreements.
Executive agreements, especially if significant enough to be reported to Congress under
the Case-Zablocki Act, are to all intents and purposes, binding treaties under
international law. On the other hand, many international undertakings and foreign
policy statements, such as unilateral statements of intent, joint communiquds, and final
acts of conferences, are not intended to be legally binding and are not considered
treaties." Grimmett, supra note 177, at 4.
277. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty
in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141,
170-71 (2004) [hereinafter Nagan, Changing Character].
Contemporary threats to international peace and security in the aftermath
of 9/11 have generated concerns that powerful non-state [sic] actors might
find refuge behind State protectors that in turn invoke the principle that
sovereignty in international law bars intervention in the sovereign domestic
jurisdiction of a State. States targeted by terrorist acts are reluctant to
accept that their responses to such attacks are constrained by principles of
sovereignty in international law. In response to this tension, the Bush
[A]dministration has developed a national security doctrine with important
challenges to sovereignty, and to notions of self-defense, the use of force, and
intervention. The most controversial elements of the Bush doctrine are its
claim to legitimate preemptive intervention, the implicit notion that 'rogue'
States may not invoke sovereignty to escape retribution, and the advocacy of
regime change.
Id. at 171.
278. The evidence relating to WMD amassed by the British Government, which the
United States used to justify its anticipatory attack of Iraq in 2003, has been strongly
questioned. Bush National Security Doctrine, supra note 271, 418 n.178.
279. For a careful examination of the notions of national sovereignty and the state
in international law regarding the question of regime replacement in light of the abuse of
sovereignty typical of the "rogue state," see generally Bush National Security Doctrine,
supra note 271 (discussing the notions of sovereignty in international law).
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achieved by discriminating between bodies politic that observe
international law and those that play by their own rules.280
The positive version of legal sovereignty is the one supported
by the principles of democratic accountability based on
transparency, responsibility and rule-of-law values.281 A state
that abuses its sovereignty may be under the undue influence of
terrorist operatives or criminal cartels.282 A new security
doctrine would insist on a much more discriminating view of
state conduct and its direct or indirect facilitation of groups
promoting criminal activity such as terrorism and other forms of
unauthorized transnational violence and coercion.283
We presume that it will remain U.S. policy to regard a
sovereign state that uses its territory to shield or provide
support to terrorist activity that targets the United States as
one that has abused its sovereignty (or no longer maintains a
legitimate claim to its sovereignty), and, as a consequence, the
sovereign (under the UN charter) weakens its legal rights over
its territorial integrity and political independence. Our
perspective, in short, assumes that a state that has abused its
sovereignty may find that its sovereignty is in fact porous and
will not shield it from retaliatory attack. Thus, a state aiding
and abetting terrorists may see such activity as a very high-risk
280. See Bush National Security Doctrine, supra note 271, at 379-80 ('The first
problem of international constitutional law is that the stability of the international
system depends on the stability and security of the state. The state, therefore, must be
given a preferred position in the international constitutional system. The circumstances
under which external interferences in a state's internal affairs might occur must be
limited and specifically defined. In this sense, the U.N. Charter-with its endorsement of
formal equality among states-protects the domestic jurisdiction of states and prohibits
aggression against states large and small. The most explicit indicators of this
constitutional principle are already in the U.N. Charter. The Charter also reflects that
the international order is not static, so claims for self-determination and independence
are tantamount to claims to change the composition of the sovereign entities in the
international system. Accordingly, the international constitutional system, like all law,
must clarify the circumstances under which it will defend the status quo or instead allow
lawful change.") (footnotes omitted).
281. See Nagan, Changing Character, supra note 277, at 166-67.
282. See id. at 173 & n.128 (noting that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan gave
terrorists a disproportionate influence and thus transformed Afghanistan into a state
that abused its sovereignty).
283. Id.
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exercise, especially if that state aids but does not control those
surrogate terror groups within its political boundaries.
Since terrorists today remain a threat, a new national
security doctrine mandates the deployment and coordination of
a multitude of strategic and tactical initiatives. A new
administration should approach the rethinking of U.S. security
doctrine with a key concern for avoiding the mistakes of the
Bush Administration. We suggest that the approach be
comprehensive. The Bush Administration's undue reliance on
rather conventional military strategies, and its depreciation of
other important strategic assets, has been unpromising and very
expensive.
The U.S. military's drawn-out struggle has proven the price
of engaging in this type of warfare. "[Counterinsurgency] is an
extremely complex form of warfare. At its core,
[counterinsurgency] is a struggle for the population's support"
that requires great flexibility, creative thinking, and skilled
tactical deployment. 284 Conventional military force in dealing
with an asymmetrical threat may be too limited a strategic
posture, dictating tactics that are costly and ineffective.
The necessary policy to promote and achieve such a goal
requires a toolkit broader and more politically nuanced than the
wooden, unimaginative approach of the Bush Administration.
Such an objective would be congruent with the strategic assets
that the United States would effectively deploy in the national
interest.285 These include the economic instrument, the military
and intelligence instruments, and the communication
instruments (touching upon diplomacy, ideology, and
education).286 Central to such an approach is the importance of
skilled professional diplomacy to complement a multitude of
284. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-24
(2006) [hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL].
285. See PERL, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that the long-term objectives of the
National Strategy for Countering Terrorism "include[:] (1) winning the War of Ideas by
advancing effective democracy; (2) promoting international coalitions and partnerships;
and (3) enhancing government counterterrorism infrastructure and capabilities.").
286. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 284, at 3-1, 3-3
(explaining the value of political, social, and economic programs in addressing the root
causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency).
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other possible persuasive initiatives in addition to coercive
modalities of action.287
Diplomacy should be a bridge in shared nation-building
enterprises.288 This should involve the enormous and unused
assets of broader civil society collaboration and communication.
This includes cooperation in economic development, the sciences,
the humanities, the arts, and, in general, educational
cooperation. This will be a more complex but critical investment
in long-term U.S. security. The close ties we have, culturally,
with states abroad will also provide us as an incident of
cooperation with important insights into that state's security
strengths and weaknesses, threats, and opportunities for
cooperation.
The enormously talented civil society of the United States
should therefore be an active partner in the process of
representing U.S. values and concerns on a global basis.289
Perhaps opening up societies to cooperation should use the
287. Id. at xxix; ("The field manual stresses the role of politics and outlines an
ideal balance of civil and military responsibilities in COIN. The manual highlights
military dependence not simply upon civilian political direction at all levels of operation,
but also upon civilian capacities in the field. It asks the U.S. civilian leadership and
bureaucracy to take on more of the responsibility and burden.").
288. See id. at xxix-xxx ("In the American civil-military tradition, elected political
leaders decide when to use force. Military leaders defer to civilians on the choice of war,
and apply their professional military judgment to the conduct of war ....
Counterinsurgency is different [from conventional military performance] for two reasons.
First, the primacy of the political requires significant and ongoing civilian involvement
at virtually every level of operations. Political leadership may ultimately deliver a
negotiated solution to aspects of the conflict or to the insurgency itself. Civilians are also
presumed best able to advise the host nation government about various nonmilitary
policies to enhance its legitimacy and marginalize insurgents. Equally important,
success in COIN relies upon non-kinetic activities like providing electricity, jobs, and a
functioning judicial system. This wide swath of operational capacities for nation-building
do not reside in the U.S. armed forces.").
289. See generally id. at xxx ("The Army had avoided developing specialized
capacities for peacekeeping in the 1990s. Come Afghanistan and Iraq, then, the military
gamely assumed it could rely upon other government agencies for these tasks." However,
"[t]he State Department, the Agency for International Development, the Department of
Justice, and other agencies often lack relevant operational competencies. The diplomatic
culture is observing and reporting, and most development work involves contracting
others for long-term results. And unlike their military counterparts, civil servants
cannot be compelled to serve.").
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model of "ping-pong diplomacy"290 but applied to an educational
"ping" and a developmental "pong." Apart from the importance
of American interests in democracy and fundamental rights,
economic enterprise, and cultural equity and fairness, there are
also the strengths of civil society in the United States in
practical development, environmental justice, human rights
activism, and educational opportunity. These components of
U.S. culture are an important part of the long-term security
preparedness of the nation. These civil society groups can
facilitate policies of power-sharing, economic justice, and
guidance toward good governance and the rule of law
foundations of development. 291
Additionally, U.S. business is global, and the United States
should therefore expect that its global representation in this
field is reflective of the American values of fairness, equality
and responsibility. The corporate presence of the United States
in any state should not be complicit in the reproduction of
alienation and anger, which may provide an excuse for
grievances against the United States that could dissolve into
terrorism. In the frontline292 of the fight against terrorism, what
290. Public Broadcasting Service, Ping-Pong Diplomacy, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
amex/china/peopleevents/pande07.html.
291. However, this approach must take into critical account "a serious imbalance
between the authorities, capabilities, and funding for our military institutions, and the
support we provide to the civilian instruments of power." Former Government Official,
supra note 251, at 3.
Responsibility for diplomacy and foreign assistance is scattered in a
'diaspora' of organizations and programs. There are now over [twenty]
different federal institutions and departments involved in international
activity and foreign assistance; support for post-conflict intervention and
reconstruction is provided through at least seven different funding channels;
and support for governance and democracy through at least ten programs.
Overall, funding and staffing for our civilian global engagement-traditional
diplomacy, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance-is inadequate.
Id.
292. Global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism are providing an additional focal
point for addressing the treatment of detainees taken in the war on terror. The
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted by
consensus by the UN General Assembly on April 13, 2005, arguably helps demonstrate
that detainee policies can be shaped within the context of multilateral cooperation to
fight terrorism, including terrorism tied to the illicit spread of WMD, Steven C. Welsh,
Ctr. For Def. Info., Nuclear Terrorism & Detainee Policies: Int'l Convention for the
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we should be exporting is U.S. values, reflected in U.S. civil
society as a partner for government in universally promoting the
long-term goal of humane and honest governance.293 Diplomacy
however, in conventional terms, assumes state-to-state
community and cooperation, which is supposed to generate
opportunity and restraint.294 Enhanced diplomacy should be a
critical component of a new national security doctrine, but it
alone is not sufficient in the effective articulation and grounding
of U.S. interests.
The critical issue for U.S. and NATO security interests, as
well as the broader interests in global peace and security, is the
unpredictability of terrorism and the genuine concern that
terror groups may acquire and deliver some forms of WMD.
Should this happen, even a retaliatory strike against a state
which ostensibly aids and abets the terror group will not undo
the damage done. Indeed, it could catalyze a train of unforeseen
reactions, leaving all states (including the original victim state)
in a much worse position than if the victim state had not even
reacted at all. While retaliation provides satisfaction, a strategy
of prevention avoids both the original incident and the spiraling
engagement in conflict that proceeds from the retribution after
the fact. Thus, the critical challenge with regard to U.S. policy
and the nuclear arsenal/terrorist problem must be preventive.
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, June 17, 2005, http://www.cdi.org/news/
law/ntc-detainees.cfm.
293. "As a consequence, in part, of civilian institutional weaknesses, we have asked
our military organizations to perform an expanding range of foreign assistance missions
normally overseen by the civilian institutions. New programs and directives have
expanded the military's mission to include reconstruction and stabilization,
humanitarian assistance, foreign security force training, and even economic
development. Many of these missions are outside the military's core competence. They
include programs that parallel existing programs at State and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), further contributing to the diaspora and
inadequate coordination of foreign assistance and national security policy planning.
Combined with the costs of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, we have doubled
defense budgets to roughly $700 billion a year, seriously weakening planning and
budgeting discipline in the Defense Department. The result of this trend is an
overstretched military, weaker civilian capacity, and a uniformed face on America's
global engagement." See Former Government Official, supra note 251, at 3.
294. HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 215-218 (Walter Carlsnaes,
Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons eds., Sage 2002).
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This modest shift in the direction of a new national security
doctrine is a critical strategic shift in more effectively protecting
homeland and global security.
A preventive strategy is, in fact, broader than simple
deterrence.295 It involves strategies that effectively and
exponentially reduce the risk of a nuclear arsenal/terrorist form
of attack. A new national security doctrine must significantly
enhance the role of diplomacy and civil society and elicit respect
for the U.S. global presence based on the most fundamental
values of the American experience. A broader approach to
communication and collaboration through all the channels of
state and society may yield credible information and
understandings of long-term value. This strategic information is
requisite to prevent terrorism from happening, here and abroad,
and to generate a stronger shared interest in combating the
terrorist threats. The notion of homeland security must be
unambiguously linked to the larger world community and global
security.
Regrettably, there is no magic bullet to secure this
particular objective. The Bush Administration has opted for a
myopic national security policy that seeks to undermine the
traditional position of the United States as a leading force in
global arms control: the Global Strike Option. These policies are
295. U.S. policy makers must address holistic requirements for deterrence. "The
aim of deterrence has always been to make an adversary fear it will suffer unacceptable
consequences if it takes certain actions. Many believe that the U.S.-Soviet deterrent
relationship worked during the Cold War because threats were credible and each side
understood the consequences of attacking the other. In the post-Cold War, post-9/ll
world, many questions arise. Who is to be deterred, by what threats? What weapons are
needed to make them credible? Is deterrence dynamic, with constant weapons
development needed to respond to changing threats, or is a modest number of nuclear
weapons of existing designs, together with U.S. conventional forces and economic might,
more than sufficient? Are existing nuclear weapons sufficient to deter North Korea, or
are new ones needed that could destroy underground bunkers where leaders might hide,
or is the nation so irrational that it is beyond deterrence, or is a North Korean nuclear
attack wildly implausible? Is a satisfactory outcome possible through diplomacy? What
capabilities are needed to deter Iran or to roll back its nuclear program? Do nuclear
forces have any relevance to deterring terrorists or their state sponsors?" Medalia, supra
note 13, at 4; see id. (considering the CTBT and nuclear testing issues that link to these
broader issues of deterrence).
20091
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
a radical change in the U.S. arms control policy.296
The increasing danger of lawlessness on the global nuclear
market has heightened its threats with the introduction of U.S.
military strategies that authorize preemptive strikes using
nuclear technology. When the Bush Administration came into
office, it was uninterested in the pending status of the CTBT.297
Ignoring the CTBT, the administration initiated a major review
of the nation's nuclear posture and emerged with a highly
controversial new doctrine: the Global Strike Option.298
The Global Strike Option implies that the United States no
longer seriously pursues a policy of nuclear arms control. This
implication furthers the unintended message that the United
States is no longer deeply committed to nuclear arms control. In
the current state of world order (or disorder), an ambiguous
position on arms control may generate nuclear slippage.
While the Global Strike Option focuses on state adversaries,
296. Jonathan Schell, A Revolution in American Nuclear Policy, GLOBAL SECURITY
INSTITUTE, May 26, 2005, http://www.ginstitute.org/archives/000268.shtml.
297. See Blechman, supra note 265, at 8 (explaining how the Bush Administration
disliked arms control treaties, including the CTBT, and exercised its right to withdraw
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2003).
298. See Jonathan Schell, Op-Ed., Letter from Ground Zero: A Revolution in
American Nuclear Policy, Nation, June 13, 2005, at 12 (Schell is The Nation's peace and
disarmament correspondent who describes the Global Strike Option as a "shocking
innovation").
For the most part, the Bush [A]dministration has sought to downplay the
role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy, though it has been
unsuccessful in conveying this position to much of the world. Its Nuclear
Posture Review was completed at the end of 2001 and revamped U.S.
doctrine to elevate the role of defenses in U.S. strategy and to open the
possibility of utilizing conventional weapons in place of nuclear weapons for
offensive strike missions. It also reduced significantly the size of the U.S.
arsenal; under current plans, the U.S. stockpile will be halved by 2012 as
compared to its size in 2000. At the same time, the [A]dministration has
tried to modernize the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, indicating a continuing
interest in maintaining weapons indefinitely and to develop two new types of
nuclear weapons: during its first term, it sought to develop a low-yield,
earth-penetrating warhead that could be used against such underground
targets as command centers; more recently, it sought to develop a Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) to hedge against the failure of existing
warheads.
Blechman, supra note 265, at 9.
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the real risk to U.S. security interests may be overlooked. Those
risks are the ubiquity of non-state terrorist activity. History has
shown that it is not easy to predict how an obscure alienated
group in some part of the planet will air their grievances. The
apparent focal lens of the Global Strike Option misdirects our
attention from this threat.
The combination of grievance, alienation, repression, and
psycho-pathology makes it important to identify as early as
possible the threat or potential threat to security, and deploy a
completely comprehensive toolkit of intervention prior to those
conflicts gravitating from low intensity to difficult-to-contain
high intensity conflicts. It is a reasonable assumption that
terrorists will attempt to access the technology and techniques
of developing crude devices for ruthless terror operations.299
Central to the terrorists' perspective is that there is no
deterrence to the sacrifice of both victim and perpetrator.
Therefore, it is critical that the U.S. nuclear posture be equipped
with flexible strategies and a wider toolkit of diplomatic,
ideological, economic, and the plenitude of coercive modalities of
action. The objective of a new national security doctrine must
therefore develop strategies that enhance the prospect of
prevention-in particular, preventing access and deployment (as
well as threats and uses) of WMD.
A critical starting point of a new national security doctrine
must be the important question of arms control and U.S.
leadership in this field.300 The prospect of arms control hinges
299. Bunn & Newman, supra note 248, at 29 ("Nuclear terrorism is a real and
dangerous threat. Some terrorist organizations, particularly [a]l Qaeda, are seeking
nuclear weapons. While the overthrow of the Taliban and the disruption of [a]l Qaeda's
old central command structure certainly reduced [a]l Qaeda's chances of pulling off such
a complex operation, [a]l Qaeda is reconstituting in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Making
nuclear bomb material from scratch is beyond the plausible capabilities of terrorist
groups, but if a sophisticated group got enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) or
separated plutonium, it might well be able to make a crude nuclear bomb. Indeed, the
U.S. intelligence community assesses that an [a]l Qaeda nuclear bomb effort probably
would not require the involvement of more than the number of operatives who carried
out the September 11, 2001 attacks, and could be just as compartmented, making it
extraordinarily difficult for the intelligence community to detect and stop.").
300. MATTHEW BUNN, SECURING THE BOMB 2008 174-75 (2008) ("For better or for
worse, there is no substitute for U.S. leadership: the United States is the country most
concerned about the nuclear terrorist threat, the country prepared to devote the largest
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upon U.S. credibility. Central to U.S. credibility in this field is
the U.S. position on the CTBT and the future of nuclear arsenals
on a global basis.
The current treaty commitment for which the United States
is bound is the obligation of Article VI of the NPT.301 Under
Article VI, the United States "undertakes to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of
the.., arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control."302 This good-faith
obligation is a solemn treaty obligation of the United States, of
its new administration, and of its new Senate.303
The pact underlying the NPT was a deal between nuclear
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states.304 The deal was that
the latter forego acquisition of nuclear weapons and remain non-
nuclear.305 The nuclear weapon states committed themselves to
a serious process of arms control in which nuclear weapon
systems were to be central in the cessation of the arms race with
a view to ultimate nuclear disarmament with all deliberate
speed.306
resources to reducing it, the country that invests most heavily in securing its own large
stockpiles, and hence the country with the most extensive experience in modern systems-
engineering approaches to nuclear material protection, control, and accounting
(MPC&A).").
301. See McNamara, supra note 249, at 31. U.S. leaders have acknowledged the
country's ethical obligations. See id. ("We pledged to work in good faith toward the
eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals when we negotiated the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968."); see also Grimmett, supra note 177, at 264 (quoting
Madeline Albright as stating that the United States will 'live up to the conditions of the
treaty," even after the Senate rejected the treaty).
302. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T.
at 483.
303. See generally id. (showing that, because the United States is a signatory, the
Treaty and its good faith obligation is binding on the United States, regardless of
administration changes).
304. Rebecca Johnson, Nuclear Weapons Treaty: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,
DISARMAMENT DIPL., Winter 2008, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd89/
89rej.htm.
305. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T.
at 483.
306. Id.
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The critical importance of the CTBT was its prohibition on
testing nuclear arsenals. This is a critical limitation on the
ambitions of would-be nuclear power aspirants. Untested
arsenals are particularly dangerous to those who might consider
using them. The NPT and the CTBT are critical components of
the arms control strategy for ridding the world of its most
dangerous threat.
Beyond legal representations of global responsibility, the
United States must approach the issue of ideological beliefs with
the flexibility of a solution-oriented approach to specific
problems in which there is respect for engagement that clarifies
the similarities and sensible differences between states in terms
of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence.307 The United States
must not approach cultural identity or confessional outlook as
an impenetrable fact.308 Instead, specific perspectives of identity
and belief must be actively engaged in, understood, moderated,
and translated into terms of shared values in peace, security,
and dignity.
Additionally, the United States has used, and should
continue to use, economic instruments to advance its interest in
307. The approach has been described as follows:
While the United States has had success in eliminating a number of terrorist
leaders and foiling planned attacks, our government has invested less effort,
let alone enjoyed success, at preventing the global recruitment and
ideological commitment of extremists who might seek to use nuclear or
biological weapons against America or its allies. These efforts demand an
approach far different from that used to capture or kill terrorists and
facilitators. They require the tools of soft power, which include the ability to
communicate persuasively about American intentions and to assist in
promoting social and economic progress within those countries where the
terrorists have a recruiting presence. Government agencies must think
creatively to develop and coordinate efforts-ranging from strategic
communications to targeted development assistance-to engage those who
might otherwise be drawn to terrorist causes.
GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at xxvi-xxvii. See generally id. (recommending that U.S.
counterterrorism strategy must more effectively counter the ideology behind WMD
terrorism, and that the United States should develop a more coherent and sustained
strategy and capabilities for global ideological engagement to prevent future recruits,
supporters, and facilitators).
308. See Former Government Official, supra note 251, at 3 (listing "[ildentity
conflicts (religion, ethnicity and nationality)" among the five fundamental issues and
underlying trends that the Obama Administration would need to deal with).
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shared security. Historically, the United States has used
economic coercion or incentives to generate a wide and flexible
range of foreign policy options.309 Such economic incentives
produce behaviors that combine a state's self-interest with
broader values of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Finally, the military instrument must remain in a strong
condition of high preparedness. Central to this idea is that, the
better the perception is of U.S. military capability, the less likely
it is that the United States will be challenged to deploy and
wield its great powers of military coercion. Even where the
expected outcome of U.S. military deployment is to prevail, a
critical outcome of such a posture should be its non-use. In fact,
military force should provide a wider toolkit of coercive
strategies short of actual violent confrontation.310 U.S. foreign
policy must move away from strategies like the Global Strike
Option, which, by embracing an aggressive first-strike policy,
promotes global insecurity and an incentive to enhance
proliferation of nuclear arsenals, with attendant dangers for the
security of the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword
of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of
being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by
madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they
abolish us."311
A comprehensive test ban treaty will halt the spiraling arms
race, obstruct the emergence of new nuclear powers, and prevent
further devastation of human health312 and the global
309. See How Sanctions Can Affect U.S. Policy Interests, Statement Before the H.
Committee on International Relations, 105th Cong. (June 3, 1998) (statement of Daniel
Fisk, Bd. of Dirs., Inst. for U.S. Cuba Relations), available at http://www.fas.org/spp/
starwars/congress/1998_h/h980603df.htm.
310. ' There is an urgent need to rebalance our foreign policy and national security
toolkit, restructure the institutions and processes, and provide adequate funding for the
civilian instruments of power." Former Government Official, supra note 251, at 4.
311. Zia Mian, Nuclear Promises, FOREIGN POL'Y IN FOcUS (June 4, 2009),
available at http:/lfpif.org/fpiftxtl6l66.
312. Over 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted and "atmospheric testing
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environment.313 Even though the science fiction nature of
arresting any sort of nuclear advancement suggests that human
efforts can never return the genie to its bottle, no one will be
able to confidently develop advanced new nuclear weapons
without testing.314 This will prevent nuclear proliferation and
will also serve as a barrier to current nuclear powers from
developing technologically advanced weapons not within their
current capability.315 Perhaps, most importantly, it will fulfill
directly produced 430,000 fatal human cancers by the year 2000. Eventually that total
will be 2.4 million." Statement of Nongovernmental Organizations to the Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
(Sept. 5, 2003) [hereinafter NGO statement].
313. Id. Article XIV conferences are held every other year to discuss methods to
obtain the signatures and ratifications of all the necessary states to the CTBT. John R.
Burroughs et al., Arms Control and National Security, 36 INT'L LAW. 471, 491 (2002);
About the Article XIV Conferences: CBTO Prepatory Commission, http://www.ctbto.org/
the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/about-the-article-xiv-conferences/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2009) (stating that Article XIV conferences are held every other year). The NGO
statement was endorsed by a coalition of nongovernmental organizations numbering
over 100 and including the Medical Association for Prevention of War, International
Physicians for the Prevention of War, Physicians for Global Survival, The Acronym
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, The Atomic Mirror, Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (UK), Grandmothers for Peace, International Institute for Peace,
International Human Rights Observer, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Pax
Christi (USA), Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Women
Against Nuclear Power, Trade Union Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Peacequest
International, The Arms Reduction Coalition, Action for U.N. Renewal, Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and Institute for Law and Peace.
Letter from Thomas Schoenfeld, Chairperson, NGO Committee on Peace, to Colleagues
of the NGO Community (Sept. 10, 2003), available at http://www.ngocongo.org/
files/letterabout the ctbt conference.doc; Letter from Ambassador Paul. H. Nitze,
Chairman of the Committee to Support the CTBT, to Senator Helms, (Feb. 4, 1999) (On-
line with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers, available at http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/laws0299.htm).
314. Johnson & Kimball, supra note 233; Walter Pincus, U.S. to Seek Options on
New Nuclear Tests, White House Worries About Arsenal's Reliability, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 2002, at A4; Lawrence Scheinman, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, NUCLEAR
THREAT INITIATIVE, Apr. 2003, available at http://www.nti.orge_research/e3_9a.html.
315. John Shalikashvili Remarks at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation
Conference (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/000316/
epf4l4.htm ("Without testing there is no way to be sure that a new design will function
as intended, or perhaps at all."); NGO Statement, supra note 312.
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the disarmament commitments the nuclear powers set forth at
the signing of the NPT.316
No doubt, concerns remain. Proponents of the CTBT must
answer these significant questions: Will the CTBT allow the
United States to ensure that their current nuclear arsenal will
continue to function properly? Will the CTBT allow the United
States to maintain its nuclear superiority? Is the United States
assured that other states will comply with CTBT obligations? If
there are extraordinary circumstances, can we pull out of the
Treaty? The answers to all of these questions are yes; and we
shall examine each issue in turn.
Under the CTBT, Can the United States Safely Maintain
Current Nuclear Arsenal?
Yes. After ratifying the CTBT, the United States will
maintain the capacity to ensure that its own stockpile of nuclear
weapons continues to function properly.317 The Stockpile
Stewardship Program was established to ensure that our
current stockpile remains a safe, effective and reliable deterrent
without having to rely on nuclear testing.318 It was designed as
a "functional equivalent to nuclear testing."319 The science-based
program was budgeted at $6.356 billion in 2008 and attracts
316. Scheinman, supra note 314. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is an objective
in the Treaty's Preamble, and Article VI of the NPT provides for the obligation to
"pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 16, 21 U.S.T. at 490. The interpretation of
this clause specifically calls for a comprehensive test ban treaty. See, e.g., George Bunn
& Roland M. Timerbaev, Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear
Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty? in AT THE NUCLEAR CROSSROADS:
CHOICES ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE EXTENSION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY 26 (John B. Rhinelander & Adam M. Scheinman eds., 1995); David A. Koplow,
Nuclear Testing and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in AT THE NUCLEAR CROSSROADS:
CHOICES ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE EXTENSION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY 64-68 (John B. Rhinelander & Adam M. Scheinman eds., 1995).
317. CTBT Facts and Fiction, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, Oct. 8, 1999,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/news/fs_91008_factsnfiction.htm.
318. Id.; Lawrence Scheinman, Issue Brief: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Apr. 2003, available at http://www.nti.org/
e.researche3_9a.html; see also Scheinman, supra note 314 (stating that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program was "established to ensure that the enduring stockpile remains a
safe, effective, and reliable deterrent without having to rely on nuclear testing.").
319. Scheinman, supra note 314.
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some of the country's best scientists.320 The program ensures
that the United States could maintain our nuclear deterrent
posture under the CTBT.321 Moreover, the safety of the nuclear
stockpile could be sufficiently maintained by a science-based
stewardship program.322
During the Senate hearings, the Stewardship Program was
one of the most hotly debated topics and opponents of the Treaty
argued that the Program could not guarantee the reliability of
the nuclear arsenal.323 Since that time, the National Academy of
Sciences conducted a study to determine whether the technical
concerns raised about the CTBT during the Senate hearings
were legitimate.324 Formed at the request of General John
Shalikashvili, former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then
special adviser to the President and Secretary of State, the
committee was chaired by Harvard Professor John P. Holdren
320. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4; SIDNEY DRELL, ET AL., JASON NUCLEAR
TESTING STUDY SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (Aug. 3, 1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/rlg/jsr-95-320.html [hereinafter JASON Report].
321. Scheinman, supra note 314; see generally JASON Report, supra note 320.
322. General John Shalikashvili explained that the United States' interests in
guarding the United States' nuclear stockpile would be protected with a science-based
stewardship program. See Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Panels II & III of a
Hearing of the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Gen. John
Shalikashvili, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) (supporting the CTBT because it
will limit nuclear weapons development, improve detection of nuclear testing, strengthen
nonproliferation, and retain the U.S. global leadership role). He predicted in 1999 that
by 2005 "the science-based stockpile stewardship program should be sufficiently
advanced." Id. Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, stated in unambiguous terms that
the United States could ensure the reliability of the nuclear stockpile without testing:
'We can enter into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty armed with the knowledge that
our nuclear arsenal is reliable, and it will continue to be so .... The supercomputer we
use today is thousands of times faster than those of a decade ago, and provides the
leading edge simulation capabilities needed to assist certification requirement without
nuclear testing." Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearing on the CTBT Before
the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (Statement of Bill Richardson, Sec'y of
Energy).
323. Issues and Arguments, supra note 4; see Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to Continue Moratorium, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (1999),
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99.
324. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY vii (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu
html/ctbt [hereinafter NAS Study].
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and filled with respected scientists.325 They concluded that the
main technical concerns of the CTBT were in fact
manageable.326 Provided certain measures are taken, including
ensuring a high quality work force and maintaining a rigorous
stockpile program, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to
maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear
arsenal without periodic nuclear explosions.327
Aside from the study, the CTBT contains a zero yield
prohibition on testing; essentially, this prohibits any explosion
which yields nuclear explosive energy.328 This is highly salient
for two vital reasons: subcritical testing and virtual testing are
permitted.329 Subcritical experiments are underground
explosions that provide the United States with critical insight
into our nuclear arsenal without producing a nuclear
explosion.330 As technology advances, virtual testing is proving
to be another useful tool in our nuclear stewardship.331
325. Id.
326. See id. at 34 (concluding that the United States was sufficiently
technologically advanced to meet any concerns raised by the CTBT).
327. Id.; see also JASON Report, supra note 320 (concluding that, among other
things, as long as the United States is allowed to invoke a supreme national interest
clause, there should be no problems in the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile);
David Hafemeister, The Case For the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, J. FED'N AM.
SCIENTISTS, Jan-Feb. 1997, at 9-10, available at http://www.fas.org/faspir/pir0297
.htm#testban; Drell, supra note 232.
328. Article 1 provides that "[e]ach State Party undertakes not to carry out any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." CTBT, supra note 1, 35
I.L.M. at 1444.
329. Asada, supra note 115, at 87. The drafting history of the Treaty supports the
idea that subcritical testing is permitted; Indonesia proposed prohibiting subcritical
tests but later withdrew its request for the sake of compromise. Id.
330. Id. at 87 n.6; see also TARIQ RAUF, TOWARDS NPT 2005: AN ACTION PLAN FOR
THE "13 STEPS" TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AGREED AT NPT 2000 27 (Center for
Nonproliferation Studies) (stating that proponents justify subcritical experiments
because they provide data to assess the reliability and safety of nuclear explosives).
Subcritical experiments are carried out at the Nevada Test Site and they involve
"chemical high explosives and fissile materials in configurations and quantities such
that no self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction can result." Id. at 26.
331. See Nuclear Testing Goes Virtual, IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/nuclear-testing-goes-virtual.
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Under the CTBT, Will the United States Maintain its
Nuclear Superiority?
Yes. The United States can maintain its nuclear
preeminence in the world without engaging in an expensive and
dangerous arms race. Currently, the United States holds an
unparalleled lead in nuclear technology.332 The United States
has conducted over 1,030 tests, far more than any other state.333
When the United States ratifies the Treaty, India and Pakistan
have hinted that they will follow suit;334 China has repeatedly
expressed its intention of ratification.335 At this point, nuclear
testing will be frozen and the U.S. lead in technology will be
guaranteed in perpetuity.336 Without testing, nuclear states will
332. Johnson & Kimball, supra note 233.
333. Hafemeister, supra note 327. The Soviet Union/Russia has conducted 715, the
UK 45, France 210, and China 45. JONATHAN MEDALIA, NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, (2005), available at http://www.history.navy.mil/
library/online/nucweps%20test%20ban.htm.
334. India, Pakistan, and China have declared voluntary moratoriums on testing,
and Pakistan and India have said that the signature of the CTBT awaits the
development of a "consensus" for such action. NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, CBT-MAJOR
PROVISIONS AND RELATED ISSUES (2009) http://www.nti.org/fwmd4l1/f211.html;
Johnson & Kimball, supra note 233. After visits to India, Senator Arlen Specter stated
that "[i]n my discussions with officials it became evident that securing compliance with
the CTBT by these two nations without U.S. ratification would be problematic."
MEDALIA, supra note 333. Lalit Mansingh, India's Foreign Secretary, "expressed his
sentiment that U.S. should not expect India to sign a treaty that the U.S. itself perceives
as flawed." Id.
335. China Assures U.N. of Ratifying CTBT Soon, DAWN (Pakistan),
(Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.dawn.com/2003/09/05/int7.htm. "'We will see a
Chinese ratification, rather sooner than later,' Zhang Yan, the Chinese ambassador to
Vienna said. 'To ratify they need a broad consensus. . . . I feel that this broad consensus
is evolving."' Id. China has conducted thirty-nine tests and the Chinese government
reportedly wrote to the U.N. Secretary General that "after a comprehensive test ban
treaty is concluded and comes into effect, China will abide by it and carry out no more
nuclear tests." MEDALIA, supra note 333, at 4. "In a white paper of December 2004,
China stated its support of early entry into force" and its continued commitment to the
test moratorium until that is accomplished. Id.
336. See Scheinman, supra note 314 (noting that the CTBT will make it "more
difficult" for nuclear countries to develop more advanced weapons); see also Coalition to
Reduce Nuclear Dangers, For a Safer America, The Case for a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, available at http://www.crnd.org [hereinafter Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers]. The Coalition is a nonpartisan alliance of seventeen of the nation's leading
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation organizations. Their members include: Arms
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not be able to upgrade their current nuclear technology,
essentially freezing each nuclear state in its current level of
proficiency.337 For China, this would impede modernization of
its nuclear arsenal and prevent it from developing smaller
warheads that could ride on a MIRVed ICBM.338 India and
Pakistan would be unable to upgrade their rudimentary one-
stage fission nuclear devices to more advanced thermonuclear
weapons.339 Even Russia would be unable to develop new types
of tactical nuclear weapons.340 The CTBT allows state parties to
pursue strong measures against States that test in violation of
the Treaty.341
Nonnuclear states would be unable to test weapons and
would therefore be prevented from joining the nuclear club with
any real confidence in any of their nuclear devices.342 Although
the CTBT is not a panacea to the nuclear problem, there is no
magic potion that can solve all global problems. With the NPT
and CTBT in force, any rogue state determined to develop
Control Association, Center for Defense Information, Federation of American Scientist,
and Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Peace Action Education Fun, Physicians for
Social Responsibility, Union of Concerned Scientists, Plutonium Challenge, Institute for
Science and International Security. Adam Eidinger, Democrats Threaten to Bring Senate
to Standstill over Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.
commondreams.org/pressreleases/august99/083199b.htm. Nobel Prize Winning physicist
and former Director of Theoretical Division of Los Alamos wrote in a letter to the
President, "[tihis treaty is uniquely in favor of the United States. We have a substantial
lead in atomic weapons technology over all other states ... we have no interest and no
need for further testing." He concluded with, "[o]ther existing nuclear powers would need
tests to make up this technological gap." 145 CONG. REC. 137, s12354, (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1999) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
337. Asada, supra note 115, at 88; Steve Kirsch, Ratifying the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty: Reflection # 2, KIRSCH FOUNDATION 2000, available at http://www.
kirschfoundation.org/who/reflection_ 2.html.
338. Hafemeister, supra note 327.
339. Scheinman, supra note 314 (noting that proponents argue a ban would
impede new nuclear states from developing advanced two-stage weapons without
testing).
340. See NAS Study, supra note 324, at 10 (asserting that Russia would not be a
threat to U.S. security under the CTBT); see id. (asserting that Russia could test and
develop new weapons if the CTBT fails).
341. Johnson & Kimball, supra note 233.
342. See Asada, supra note 115, at 88 (stating that because a test ban would
preclude confirming whether a newly developed weapon operates as designed,
nonnuclear states would not know if the weapons actually worked).
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nuclear weapons does so in the face of enormous international
pressure and stands to suffer the full range of reprisals
authorized by international law. 343
Is the United States Assured that Other States Will Comply
with CTBT Obligations?
Yes. The CTBT Organization has the political, economic,
and scientific capability to effectively monitor states and ensure
compliance with CTBT obligations.344 There should be no doubt
that a U.S.-backed CTBT will prevent other states from
acquiring nuclear weapons (or upgrading current 'arsenals). A
combination of on-site inspections and 300 sensors strategically
located around the globe would identify noncompliant states.345
Ensuring that states do not improve their nuclear arsenals
or create new ones depends entirely on the capabilities of the
verification process. The International Monitoring System (IMS)
anchors this process, which is complemented by on-site
inspections.346 The IMS system employs over 337 facilities in
ninety states around the world and its sole job is to detect
nuclear explosions underground, in water, and in the
atmosphere.347 At present, over 246 of the facilities have been
built and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO oversees
the facilities in Vienna.348
343. See Shalikashvili, supra note 315.
344. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 5 ("Detection, identification, and attribution of
nuclear explosions rest on a combination of methods, some being deployed under the
International Monitoring System (IMS), some deployed as National Technical Means
(NTM), and some relying on other methods of intelligence collection together with openly
available data not originally acquired for treaty monitoring.").
345. On the issue of nuclear test detection and verifiability, Secretary Richardson
explained in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee that "[t]he treaty gives
us the right to request challenge inspections, and provides for international monitoring.
Under the treaty, we will deploy a network of more than 300 sensors, blanketing the
globe, that can detect a nuclear explosion and can help us identify nations that have
acquired nuclear capabilities." Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearing Before the S
Comm. on Armed Servs., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Bill Richardson, U.S. Energy
Sec'y), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/1999/991007br.pdf.
346. CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1449.
347. Asada, supra note 115, at 90; see CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1449. The
IMS has facilities with four types of monitoring technologies: seismological, hydro-
acoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide. Id.
348. Tibor T6th, Editorial, CTBTO MAGAZINE, Apr. 2009, at 2, 12. All relevant data
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The National Academy of Sciences Study affirmed the
widely held belief that all of these assets could detect nuclear
explosions with nuclear yields down to 1 kiloton.349 A small
nuclear weapon, similar in size to the Hiroshima Bomb, yields
roughly ten to twenty kilotons.350 In fact, some studies indicate
that explosions well below the 1-kiloton level can be detected.351
States that test nuclear weapons for the first time would test
weapons with a yield somewhere in the 5 kiloton range,352 as
Pakistan did.353 Conducting tests below the 1-kiloton level is
extremely difficult; new-nuclear and nonnuclear states are not
able to reliably test below the threshold.354 Although there is a
technique called decoupling which involves underground testing
that does reduce the seismic signal of a several kiloton explosion
down to below one kiloton, this technique presents Herculean
obstacles not easily overcome.355 Only highly experienced
regarding the Preparatory Commission are available at its website. CTBTO Preparatory
Commission, http://www.ctbto.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2009). The Preparatory
Commission is responsible for the global verification regime, ensuring that States do not
violate the Treaty by testing. See CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1444 (giving the
CTBTO these responsibilities).
349. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 5; The CTBT: Achievements, Challenges and
Opportunities, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.vertic.org/assets
CTBT%20docs/VERTIC%20ACA%20CTBT%20Seminar%20Report.pdf.
350. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 65.
351. Paul G. Richards, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia
University, Seismology and CTBT Verification, http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/-richards/
SeismoandCTBTVerif.html.
352. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Dr. Richard Garwin), reprinted in THE
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: NEXT STEPS, ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 72 (2000),
available at http://www.iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/l1982/CTBT.pdf. The JASON group
used this figure when they advised President Clinton on the CTBT. Id.
353. Asada, supra note 115, at 115 & n.107. The Pakistani tests yielded one bomb
in the thirty to thirty-five range, one at twelve kilotons, and a few others between seven
and eight and between one and three. Id.
354. See id. at 115-16 (stating that proliferating states lack the experience in
nuclear testing and that low yield tests are unreliable for making advances in weapons
design).
355. See id. at 116-17 (noting that although detailed decoupling effects are not
known, the maximum decoupling factor often quoted in scientific literature is seventy,
making a yield of seven kilotons appear to be 100 tons); Thomas Graham Jr., Russia,
China, and the CTBT in LAWYERS ALLIANCE FOR WORLD PEACE, WHITE PAPER ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 62 (2000) (concluding that only China and
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nuclear states can test below the 1-kiloton level, yet these tests
would not significantly add to their nuclear technology.356 Thus,
with the exception of decoupling, nuclear tests by U.S.
adversaries with any practical application are detectable.357
Aside from the scientific capability of ensuring the
enforcement of the CTBT, the United States has the political
advantage of encouraging non-signatory members to ratify and
join the Treaty regime. The CTBT will not enter into force until
all forty-four states with nuclear reactors ratify the Treaty.358
As we continue testing, we expect less capable states facing
potentially well-armed opponents to never test even one nuclear
weapon.359 It is inherently difficult for the United States to
argue for others to do what it itself has not done.360
Russia could successfully accomplish the decoupling procedure without detection); See
Hafemeister, supra note 327, at 12 ("it is widely felt that a clandestine test of a kiloton
(or larger), that was decoupled to a degree that enabled the test to escape detection by
seismic means and which did not have yield excursions and venting, would require the
resources of a very technologically sophisticated nation.").
356. Id. ("[T]he Shalikashvili report points out that: 'Nuclear weapon states could
not make a major qualitative breakthrough without testing above several kilotons."'); see
Shalikashvili, supra note 315; NAS Study, supra note 324, at 68 (very-low-yield testing
will allow proof tests of compact weapons with yield up to 1-2kt, and only partial
development of primaries for thermonuclear weapons); Kirsch, supra note 337.
357. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE CTBT: FINAL
REPORT (The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre 2000),
http://www.ctbtcommission.org/FinalReport.pdf ("The three most credible evasion
scenarios that have been proposed to foil monitoring networks are decoupling, hiding a
nuclear explosion in another event, and evading attribution. There are no credible
examples of the latter two scenarios, and thus, the focus has been on decoupling."); While
there may be some cheating, the committee concluded, "[tihe worst-case scenario under a
no-CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to U.S. security interests-sophisticated
nuclear weapons in the hands of many more adversaries-than the worst-case scenario
of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the constraints posed by the monitoring
system." NAS Study, supra note 324, at 78.
358. CTBT Article 14 specifies that the CTBT will not enter into force until 180
days after the forty-four states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty ratify the treaty. CTBT,
supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1457, 1478. Annex 2 includes Pakistan, Israel, India, N. Korea,
United States, France, and others. Id. at 1478.
359. McNamara, supra note 249.
360. Interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Strobe Talbott, Former Deputy Sec'y
of State (Mar. 6, 2006) available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10052/talbott.html
('One of [the Administration's] benchmarks, so called, in dealing with the Indians was to
try to get them... to sign and ratify the CTBT. Well when the U.S. Senate said, 'Well,
we're not going to ratify the CTBT,' it was a little hard for us to insist that somebody else
2009]
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In 1995 the mayor of Nagasaki described the aftermath of
the nuclear explosion (a bomb considered small by today's
standards) to the International Court of Justice.
Nagasaki became a city of death where not even insects
could be heard ... countless men, women, and children
began to gather for a drink of water at the banks of the
nearby Urakami River, their hair and clothing scorched
and their burnt skin hanging off in sheets like rags.
Begging for help they died one after another in the
water or in heaps on the bank.361
Within four months, over 704,000 people had died.362
This scene may be repeated on a much larger scale if the
United States does not take the lead and ratify the CTBT.363 We
are both politically and legally obligated to do S0.364 If the
United States does not ratify the CTBT, nuclear proliferation
will happen exponentially.365 States that have not signed it will
do it.").
361. McNamara, supra note 249 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8)).
362. Id.
363. See id. ("If the United States continues its current nuclear stance, over time,
substantial proliferation of nuclear weapons will almost surely follow.").
364. "Under Article VI of the NPT, each party to the NPT agrees to pursue good
faith negotiations on nuclear prevention measures aimed towards eventual
comprehensive disarmament." Lalla, supra note 91, at 112-13; see Helen M. Cousineau,
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global Non-Proliferation Regime: A U.S.
Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407, 417 & n.53 (1994). 'In addition, all Review
Conferences convened to determine the effectiveness of the NPT have called for the
CTBT to be implemented, stating that it is the most effective measure to halt a nuclear
arms race." See Lalla, supra note 91, at 113; Ambassador Thomas Graham, President of
the Lawyers Alliance for World Security and former Special Representative of the
President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament stated: 'The U.S.
succeeded in achieving the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
in 1995 on the basis of the commitment of the nuclear weapons states to conclude the
Test Ban Treaty. This is a good bargain that must honored." See generally Koplow, supra
note 51.
365. A future in a non-CTBT world has been described as follows:
A future no-CTBT world, then, could be a more dangerous world than
today's, for the United States and for others. In particular, the directions
from which nuclear attack on the United States and its allies would have
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continue to abstain and states that have ratified it will stop
honoring their legal obligations not to test.366 Without U.S.
ratification, the Treaty cannot enter into force.367 With the
passage of too much time, the CTBT may be considered a
failure, lose its moral force and currency, and effectively end
over fifty years of nonproliferation progress.368
Without a test ban treaty, the NPT becomes irrelevant;
states such as Japan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and North
Korea will surely develop nuclear weapons.369 China, Russia,
become conceivable-and the means by which such attack might be carried
out (meaning not only intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) but also,
among others,... truck bombs ... )-would have multiplied alarmingly.
NAS Study, supra note 324, at 8; 'The arms race which could well ensue (if no
ratification of the CTBT) would be extremely dangerous." Former Ambassador to
Pakistan Robert B. Oakley in a letter to Senator Biden.
366. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 8 (stating that a breakdown in the NPT regime
due to nations not ratifying the CTBT might lead to more widespread nuclear testing).
367. CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1457, 1478. CTBT Article 14 specifies that
the CTBT will not enter into force until 180 days after the forty-four states listed in
Annex 2 to the Treaty ratify the treaty. Id. at 1457.
368. "Regarding the status of the U.S. obligation in the wake of the Senate's
rejection of the treaty, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in October 1999 that
the United States will 'live up to the conditions of the treaty."' FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 147, at 264. A fundamental principle of the law of treaties states that the
provisions of the treaty will not have any legal binding effect until its entry into force.
But see United Nations: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations art. 24, Mar. 20,
1986, 25 I.L.M. 543, 560 (stipulating that the provisions of a treaty regulating the
manner or date of its entry into force, reservations, and other matters arising necessarily
before the entry into force of the treaty apply). However, under Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention, if a signatory takes an act which would defeat the object and purpose of the
Treaty, then the treaty is no longer binding on them. See Asada, supra note 115, at
94-95. The Senate's rejection could qualify as such an act. See id. at 101 (discussing the
complications the international community has faced "since the CTBT ratification was
rejected by the U.S. Senate."). For a discussion of the legal applicability of the Treaty
prior to entry into force via customary international law, or the rule of law of treaties
regarding obligations imposed on signatories of treaty yet to enter into force, see id. at
92-101.
369. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 8 ("Plausibly larger than the direct effects ...
is [the] breakdown of the NPT regime, manifested in more widespread testing (by such
countries as North Korea, Iraq, Iran for example), which could lead in turn to nuclear
weapons acquisition by Japan, South Korea, and many others."); see also McNamara,
supra note 249 (claiming that if the United States continues on its current trend,
substantial proliferation of nuclear weapons will almost surely follow in some, or all of
nations like Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Taiwan).
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Pakistan, and India may improve their nuclear arsenals,
creating deadlier bombs while closing the gap between them and
U.S. nuclear superiority.370 These two scenarios could lead to a
nuclear exchange destroying land, killing hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of people.371 Such an exchange may
result from accident or from asymmetrical activity that is not
under the control of a sovereign state. The fewer arsenals there
are around the globe, the safer we all are.
All of this can be avoided if the United States ratifies the
CTBT.372 Although the CTBT will not completely prevent all
nuclear advances or development, the alternative is a world
where more states have more advanced nuclear weapons and
the possibility of a nuclear launch becomes a dangerous
reality.373 Consider the success of the NPT. In 1963, prior to its
entry into force, the Kennedy Administration conservatively
predicted that without the NPT, more than fourteen states
would have developed nuclear weapons.374 When former Soviet
Republics, the Middle East, and Latin American totalitarian
regimes are added to the list, the number exceeds thirty.375 The
370. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 7-8 (stating that China, Russia, India, and
Pakistan would be able to improve their nuclear capabilities if allowed to test.
371. See, e.g., Bruce G. Blair, The Folly of Nuclear War-Gaming for Korea and
South Asia, BRUCE BLAIR'S NUCLEAR COLUMN, Apr. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.cdi.org/blair/nuclear-folly.cfm (stating that the use of nuclear weapons may
escalate to all out war that inflicts the maximum possible casualties worldwide);
Medalia, supra note 13 (stating that a cascade of nuclear proliferation might occur);
DISCOURAGING A CASCADE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES 9 (International Security
Advisory Board) (2007), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISAB-
Nuclear Cascade Report.pdf (showing that even states that are not "rogue" may become
involved in a cascade).
372. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, an international commission
organized in Sweden, issued a report in June 2006 stating that "[t]he Commission
believes that a U.S. decision to ratify the CTBT would strongly influence other countries
to follow suit. It would decisively improve the chances for entry into force of the treaty
and would have more positive ramifications for arms control and disarmament than any
other single measure." WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, WEAPONS OF
TERROR: FREEING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS 107 (2006),
available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files[Weapons-of-Terror.pf.
373. See id. (stating that if the United States does not ratify the CTBT, then the
current lack of nuclear testing will not last much longer).
374. See Bunn, supra note 74.
375. Id. (enumerating countries that, if they acquired nuclear weapons, would
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NPT established a nonproliferation norm, locked in the nuclear
club at five, and utilized international incentives to prevent
proliferation.376 As a result of the NPT's success, only four states
(including North Korea) have developed nuclear weapons since
1963.377
India acquired nuclear arms in 1998; yet its leaders have
asserted that they would ratify the CTBT given the proper
circumstances.378 Although India is not a signatory to either the
NPT or the CTBT,379 the proverbial cat is out of the bag. It has
nuclear weapons and has tested them.380 However, India is a
stable democracy, a key U.S. ally, it has imposed a moratorium
on testing,381 and its arsenal was created as a deterrent against
neighboring enemies Pakistan and China.382 The last
Administration offered India a nuclear deal that would
conceivably violate the NPT, yet this is outside the scope of this
cause their rivals or neighbors to do the same, bringing the count up to thirty).
376. Id.
377. See id. (subtracting the five countries permitted to have nuclear weapons from
the nine total and counting North Korea but not Iran). See generally MITCHELL REISS,
BRIDLED AMBITION: WHY COUNTRIES CONSTRAIN THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES (1995).
378. Rationality on Pakistan and India, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at A18;
Kenneth J. Cooper, India Rejects Some Weapons Restraints: U.S. Praises Premier's
Promise to Embrace Nuclear Test Ban, Tighten Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1998, at
A37.
379. Lalla, supra note 91, at 104.
380. Id. at 103.
381. Id. at 132; see Press Release, Physicians for Social Responsibility, India
Declares Commitment to Nuclear Weapons (Mar. 3, 1999) (reporting that India agreed to
a moratorium on testing); James Bennet, Summit Talks Shift Focus to Atom Tests by
New Delhi, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1998, at A10 ("Mr. Clinton said India had 'the world's
largest middle class and 50 years of vibrant democracy to its credit,' and hoped that 'the
United States and India [c]ould be close friends and partners for the 21st century.").
382. Lalla, supra note 91, at 132; Press Release, India Declares Commitment to
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 381 ("Pakistan built nuclear weapons as a deterrent
against India. India wanted them as a deterrent against China. China built them as a
deterrent against the U.S. and Russia."). In 1999 the National Security Advisory Board
declared its policy of limiting its nuclear arsenal as a "minimum credible nuclear
deterrent" with only the Prime Minister being able to decide on whether to strike or not.
P. Jayaram, Nation Unveils Draft of its Nuclear Doctrine, INDIA ABROAD, Aug. 27, 1999,
at 6. See generally Praful Bidwai & Achin Vanaik, India Nuclear Daze: The Domestic
Politics of Nuclearization, in TESTING THE LIMITS: THE INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR GAMBIT
17(1998).
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article.383 The deal may not garner approval in India, and
regardless whether it is signed by both states, the CTBT still
has a role to play.384 If India signs the CTBT, it will not be
allowed to test nuclear weapons; without testing, it will be
unable to upgrade their nuclear arsenals from simple one stage
fission devices to more advanced thermonuclear bombs,
effectively freezing its nuclear capabilities at a rudimentary
level.385
The Iran conflict presents a more complicated dilemma. Iran
is a signatory to both the NPT and the CTBT (1996), but it has
not yet ratified the CTBT.386 Iran's ratification is required for
the Treaty to enter into force,387 but it has recently threatened
383. Jimmy Carter, A Dangerous Deal With India, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, at
A19; Dafna Linzer, Rice to Lay Out U.S.-India Nuclear Deal Before Some Skeptical
Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, at A17.
384. India Rejects U.S. Proposal on Nuclear Test Ban, TIMES OF INDIA,
Apr. 17, 2006, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1493730.cms (stating India
does not agree with a provision in the bilateral agreement that would discontinue
cooperation if India were to detonate a nuclear weapon); K. Subrahmanyam, Things
Change, Times Change, INDIAN EXPRESS, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/
news/things-change-times-change/2678/ ("The issue of India being entrapped into a
bilateral commitment in an agreement with the U.S. on nuclear cooperation not to carry
out nuclear tests has proved to be a flash in the pan.").
385. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 8 ("India and Pakistan could use their option of
testing, as non-parties [sic] to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to perfect boosted fission
weapons and thermonuclear weapons, greatly increasing the destructive material and
the destructive power deliverable by a given force of aircraft or missiles."); see also Rami
Lakshmi, Key Indian Figures Call for Nuclear Tests Despite Deal with U.S., WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontent/artile/2009/10/04/AR2009100402865.html (suggesting that India's 1998
nuclear testing did not provide sufficient results and that the consequences of a
universal test ban would mean that India could not complete the further testing
necessary to create a weapon); as long as India "stays outside the NPT regime, .. . the[y]
remain[] a serious risk of illicit proliferation." Kevin M. Brew, The Re-Emergence of
Nuclear Weapons as 'The Coin of the Realm" and the Return of Nuclear Brinkmanship in
South Asia: The Nuclear Sword of Damocles Still Hangs by a Thread, 52 NAVAL L. REV.
177, 190-91 (2005).
386. Arms Control Association, The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:
Signatories and Ratifiers, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheetsctbtsig (last visited on
Sept. 15, 2009) (showing that Iran signed the CTBT on Sept. 24, 1996); Daniel Robicheau
& Philippa Winkler, Iran, the US, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, PEACE
MAGAZINE, Oct.-Dec. 2007, at 24, available at http://archive.peacemagazine.org
v23n4p24.htm ("Iran has long been a signatory to the NPT.").
387. CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1457. CTBT Article 14 specifies that the
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to pull out of the NPT after refusing to allow on-site IAEA
inspectors.388 Iran maintains its uranium production is
exclusively for peaceful purposes, completely consistent with the
NPT.389 The United States and other members of the Security
Council believe otherwise and consequently are trying to pass a
U.N. Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran.390
If Iran pulls out of the NPT, it will be able to proliferate nuclear
weapons without fear of international legal reprisal via the
NPT. Even worse, this may spark a Middle East arms race with
both Egypt and Saudi Arabia involved.391
The United States is in a delicate and somewhat hypocritical
situation. The United States has demanded that Iran comply
with the NPT and international law yet the United States has
failed to follow its own obligations under the NPT (ratifying the
CTBT).392 With Iran threatening to destroy Israel, the situation
is explosive.393 U.S. demands lack the requisite credibility when
CTBT will not enter into force until 180 days after the forty-four states listed in Annex 2
to the Treaty ratify the treaty. Id. at 1478. Annex 2 includes Iran. Id.
388. Christine Hauser, Iran Says It Will Spurn Any U.N. Nuclear Edict, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2006, at A8 ("President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said yesterday that
international treaties became 'invalid' as soon as they failed to secure the rights of
nations. He said that if a nation's rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
were violated, 'Then that nation would revise its decision and the treaty would become
invalid,' the Iranian news agency reported.").
389. Id. ("The remarks were the latest that Iran had issued in defending what it
says is its right to develop its nuclear program, which it says is for generating power.").
390. Id. ("Britain and France circulated a draft Security Council resolution last
Wednesday demanding that Iran give up its nuclear program, which the West believes
Iran is using to develop nuclear weapons. The measure was drafted under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, which makes compliance with resolutions mandatory and
opens the way to penalties or military action against nations that defy them. But
imposing penalties would require a second resolution.").
391. David E. Sanger, Suppose We Just Let Iran Have the Bomb, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2006, § 4, at 1.
392. See ARJUN MAKHIJANI & NICOLE DELLER, NATO AND NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE NATO ALLIES OF THE UNITED
STATES UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN TREATY 9 (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 2003), available
at http://www.ieer.orglreportslnato/fullrpt.pdf ("[T]he United States has abandoned. ..
its longstanding commitment to ratify and adhere to a CTBT.").
393. Nazila Fathi, Iranian Leader Renews Attack on Israel at Palestinian Rally,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A7 ("President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Friday that
Israel was a 'constant threat' and predicted it was on the verge of 'being eliminated."').
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the United States advocates international law in one breath and
then disregards it in the other. If the United States, with the
strongest conventional military in the history of the world and
the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenal cannot
commit to a test ban, why should weaker states, especially those
hostile to the United States, agree to be nuclear free? 394
Once Committed to the CTBT, Can the United States Pull
Out of the Treaty?
Yes. In extraordinary circumstances, the United States can
withdraw from the Treaty.395 Article IX of the CTBT-the
"Supreme National Interests" clause-provides that a state
party may withdraw from the Treaty if it determines that
"extraordinary events" related to the subject matter of the
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.396 This safeguard
allows the President, in consultation with the Congress, to
withdraw from the CTBT if the Secretaries of Defense and
Energy inform the President that a high level of confidence in
the safety or reliability of a nuclear stockpile could no longer be
certified without testing.397 Authority to withdraw from the
CTBT derives from the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) article 54, as well as the withdrawal provision
of the Treaty itself.398
These comments "echoed his remark last year about 'wiping Israel off the map'...." Id.
394. See Johnson & Kimball, supra note 233 ('The United States, which had
played a leadership role in negotiating the CTBT, is now one of the major hold-out
states."). "[T]he United States has deployed approximately 4,500 strategic, offensive
nuclear warheads. Russia has roughly 3,800. The strategic forces of Britain, France and
China are considerably smaller, with 200-400 nuclear weapons in each state's arsenal.
The new nuclear states of Pakistan and India have fewer than 100 weapons each."
McNamara, supra note 249.
395. CTBT, supra note 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1456.
396. Id. 'This is a rather standard withdrawal clause for an arms control treaty
and is similar to the withdrawal clause in the NPT." Jonas, supra note 33, at 1041.
397. Jonas, supra note 33, at 1019-20; see McNamara, supra note 249, at 34
(stating the Bush Administration will be seen as breaking with the CTBT); see also
Issues and Arguments, supra note 4, at 16 (stating that President Clinton acknowledged
the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the CTBT).
398. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679,
699 [hereinafter VCLT]. VCLT article 54 provides that termination or withdrawal from a
treaty may occur either according to the provisions of the treaty or with the consent of all
the parties to the treaty after consultation. Id. at 699. However, the United States has
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The United States' ability to remove itself from
international legal obligations is not theoretical. President Bush
announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty399 on December 13, 2001; and the withdrawal
became effective on June 13, 2002 pursuant to the terms of the
treaty.400 Anyone who continues to question the ability of a state
to withdraw from treaties (on the basis of that state's perception
of the treaty's impact on its supreme national interests) should
note that even North Korea had the legal authority to withdraw
from the NPT.401
The control and regulation of nuclear weapons for the
maintenance of homeland security, as well as international
peace and security, is the most critical foreign policy and
national security issue of our time. Support for the Treaty is
overwhelming; the public, public officials, military commanders,
scientists, and academics comprise the broad support base.402
More importantly, perhaps, the Senate has already committed a
bipartisan commission to a careful review of the Treaty.403
yet to ratify the VCLT (although "the United States played a leading role in negotiating
the Vienna Convention at a conference of more than 100 nations and signed it with
almost fifty other countries on May 23, 1969."). Treaties and Other International
Agreements, supra note 19, at 20. Nevertheless, the Restatement (Third) on Foreign
Relations Law reinforces that authority using similar language. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 332(1) (1987).
399. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
400. Id. at 3446; see Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary,
Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/6848.htm (highlighting the change in circumstances
and citing the withdrawal provision in article XV(2) of the ABM).
401. See Press Release, U.N. Conference on Disarmament Debates Middle East,
North Korean Withdrawal from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Other Topics
(Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/news/pressdocs/2003/dcf422.doc.htm
(indicating the Democratic People Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the treaty was
well within its right to do so). UN Security Council Resolution 1718 specifies that North
Korea must retract its withdrawal from the NPT, but North Korea has not yet done so.
See S.C. Res. 1718, para. 3, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
402. See Daryl G. Kimball, Prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOCIATION, http:/! http:/lwww.armscontrol.orglsubjectlctbtlDaryl'sRemarks
_Bunn_04?print ('The results of a recent national public opinion poll .. show that 87%
of those surveyed support U.S. participation in the CTBT.").
403. WILLIAM J. PERRY ET AL., AMERICA'S STRATEGIC POSTURE: THE FINAL REPORT
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While it has been nine years since the CTBT's defeat in the
Senate, the world still looks to the United States for leadership
in the nuclear arena. As the world's only superpower,404 the
burden of leadership, both moral and ethical, falls on the United
States. For over half a century the world has been working
towards disarmament and the United States has always been
the driving force behind that worthy objective. In 1999, partisan
politics unapologetically undermined that progress. When the
entire global community comes together to tackle an issue as
delicate and ubiquitous as nuclear disarmament, when the very
survival of humanity hangs in the balance, it is a tragedy when
partisan politics destroys all that has been so nobly achieved.405
VII. POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the original submission of this piece, and prior
to its publication, there have been a number of salient
developments in national and international politics regarding
the CTBT. These developments could prove highly influential in
terms of the U.S. posture on arms control and, in particular, its
posture regarding the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
81 (2009), available at http://www.usip.org/files/America'sStrategic-PostureAuth
_Ed.pdf. The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
supports the review conducted by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States. BOB GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 54. 'That
review includes consideration of the long-term reliability, safety, and effectiveness of the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. The review also covers the effectiveness of the international
monitoring system that is designed to identify and locate underground nuclear tests in
order to evaluate the potential reconsideration of the CTBT." Id. at 53-54
(recommending that the current moratoria on nuclear testing (observed independently
by each of the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT) be maintained and recognizing
that the issue of a CTBT is likely to be reconsidered by the Obama Administration but
taking no position on the CTBT in its report out of deference to the Commission on the
Strategic Posture).
404. Country Profile: United States of America, BBC NEWS, Aug. 20, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/americas/country-profiles/1217752.stm.
405. The research upon which this report relies was provided in part by law
students who seek to participate fully in the complex and value-sensitive world of policy
decision-making. If this report has value in the public interest then credit should fall to
them: Enita Kushi, Erin Slemmens, Justin McCormack, Kurt Zaner, Charles Douglas,
Jarrett Deluca, Zachary Warren, Ryan Koslosky, Nadia Darkazalli, Daniel Dawson,
Kateryna Mikhno, Matthew Belisle, and Dmitri Goubarkov.
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weapons.
In September 2008, then Presidential-Candidate Obama
indicated that, "[a]s president, I will reach out to the Senate to
secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date
and will then launch a diplomatic effort to bring onboard other
states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter
into force."406 When President Obama took office, he indicated
that he would aggressively pursue the process to secure the
ratification of the CTBT. In January of 2009, Secretary of State-
Nominee Hillary Clinton confirmed that:
The President-Elect and I are both strongly committed
to Senate approval of the CTBT and to launching a
diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose
ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into
force. A lesson learned from 1999 is that we need to
ensure that the administration work intensively with
Senators so they are fully briefed on key technical
issues on which their CTBT votes will depend.407
Secretary of Defense Gates has indicated that, with modest
qualifications on verification, the United States "probably
should" ratify the CTBT.408 To that end, the Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Kerry, has
indicated that he intends to take action in the Senate, stating
that he will "begin working to build the necessary bipartisan
support for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty. . ." 409 "[Sluccess," Kerry stated, "would be the
single greatest arms control accomplishment for the new Senate
and it would reestablish America's traditional leadership role on
406. Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q & A. President-elect Barack Obama,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2008, at 31, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
system/files/ObamaQ-AFINALDec 10_2008.pdf.
407. Nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton Department of State Secretary of
State: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 26 (2009),
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files[KerryClintonQFRs.pdf.
408. Robert Gates, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Address to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace: Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century
(Oct. 28, 2008), available at http:Ilwww.carnegieendowment.orglfiles/lO28_transcrip-
gates.checked.pdf.
409. John Kerry, Editorial, New Directions for Foreign Relations, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 13, 2009, at A13.
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nonproliferation."410
On April 5, 2009, President Obama addressed thousands of
people in a square outside Prague Castle, and reaffirmed his
attempt to push the United States to sign the international
CTBT.411 The President acknowledged that nuclear weapons
remain one of the greatest threats to human survival and
human security.412 First, addressing the bilateral treaty
between the United States and Russia, President Obama
declared that the United States would negotiate a new strategic
arms reduction treaty with the Russians this year.413 Then,
Obama indicated that, consistent with the treaty obligation in
the NPT, the CTBT is an important step toward completely
ridding the world of nuclear weapons in the future.414
Ten years have passed since the Senate defeated the CTBT.
The critical question for the administration's strategy to secure
the advice and consent of the Senate is, "What conditions might
enhance the prospect of a successful advice and consent vote in
the Senate?" During the ten year period, there have been
political changes in the Senate, and there have been political
transformations in the technological capacity to secure the
integrity of the Treaty. In addition, a significant number of
states have endorsed the Treaty. We will briefly restate these
changes.
The first major issue of change upon a proposed policy of
non-testing is the assured reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
In the last ten years (and even in the last few months), reports
have been released assuring that non-testing will have no
serious effect on the integrity and reliability of the U.S.
410. Id.
411. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Remarks by President
Barack Obama (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/
Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
412. See id. (stating that nuclear weapons stockpile reduction is "fundamental to
the security of our nations and to the peace of the world").
413. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Joint Statement by
President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of
the United States of America (Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press.office/Joint-State ment-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-
Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America.
414. Id.
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arsenal.415 Today's stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons is
composed of proven designs that are beyond the stage of possible
production anomalies.416 The issue of safety and reliability
normally implicate nonnuclear subsystems.417 This means that
these nonnuclear systems can be rebuilt and tested without
violating the CTBT.418 Studies indicate that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program can ensure the reliability of the stockpile
into the foreseeable future-provided, of course, that the
program is properly funded.419 Its current level of funding is 6.6
billion dollars a year.420 In addition, nuclear technology under a
testing moratorium has significantly increased the technical
competency of specialists, since researchers now study weapons
physics in great depth without the demands imposed by an
explosive testing program.421
The second major issue of change is the weakening in
substance of the argument of senators who object to the CTBT
on the basis of concerns about the regime of verification. In the
ten years that have elapsed, much has happened to improve the
capacity for verification.422 These improvements are particularly
relevant to counter what had been the most compelling
argument of the Republicans during the stunted hearing.
The topic of partisanship leads us to the third major issue of
change-the political composition of the Senate itself and the
415. See, e.g., Kurt Gottfried, Sowing Nuclear Misconceptions, NATURE,
Jan. 13, 2000, at 131, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons-andglobal_
security/nuclear.weapons/policy-issues/the-weapons-labs-role.html (stating that tests
were conducted to evaluate new designs, not necessarily to test the reliability of existing
weapons); see CHRISTOPHER PAINE, FACING REALITY: RESUMING NUCLEAR TEST
EXPLOSIONS WOULD HARM U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (National Resources
Defense Council, 2009), available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/acato.asp ("[T]he
current arsenal is 'safe' in that it meets modern 'one point' safety standards against
accidental nuclear detonation.").
416. SEAN DUNLOP & JEAN DU PREEZ, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CTBT:
RENEWED HOPE OR POLITICS AS USUAL? (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2009), available at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/e3_ctbt_unitedstates.html.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See infra.
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degree of possible antipathy toward the CTBT. Many of those
senators originally opposing the treaty are Republican and are
still in the U.S. Senate. These senators may also be seen to hold
a strong ideological antipathy to international law and, in
particular, to the binding nature of an international treaty
implicating national security concerns. However, many
originally opposed to the treaty have come to view it
differently.423 Nevertheless, the power of the Senate vote is
undetermined.424
It is of great political significance that the President and the
Democratic majority in the Senate insist upon ratification as a
bipartisan issue, since the vote of ratification will require two-
thirds of the Senate's vote. As a bipartisan issue, it is linked to
the pre-existing bipartisan consensus that, as a practical matter,
has not seen U.S. nuclear testing in almost twenty years.425
Indeed, even though the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT, there
has been no subsequent nuclear testing by the United States.426
The consensus on the banning of nuclear tests has
invariably been linked to the bipartisan character of arms
control policy of this nation. The critical point of division,
therefore, will be the political implications and the diplomatic
effects of an acceptance of the treaty. The central concern here is
a longstanding issue with senators on the extreme right of the
political spectrum. National security, as they see it, is
essentially a matter of exclusive national sovereignty. A treaty
dealing with national sovereignty will therefore be seen as
encroaching on U.S. sovereignty in an area that is
quintessentially a matter of internal sovereign competence.
A response to this is that every international agreement or
understanding generally contains benefits, which means an
423. DUNLOP & PREEZ, supra note 416 ("[T]here have been significant changes in
attitude among several highly influential former Republican secretaries of defense and
state who opposed the Treaty in 1999 but support it today.").
424. Id. (stating that only eight votes are needed from outside democratic caucus
for treaty ratification in 2009, compared to the twenty-two votes needed in 1999).
425. OnlineNevada.org, Underground Nuclear Testing at the Nevada Test Site,
http://www.onlinenevada.orgJUnderground-NuclearTesting-aLthe-NevadaTestSite
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
426. Id.
[Vol. 32:1
CTBT & National Security
extension of sovereignty and obligations, which implies
limitation. The critical question is-are the benefits that accrue
to U.S. national security interests more important than the
obligations assumed under the Treaty? In general, the practice
of the United States under both the Republicans and Democrats
has indicated a longstanding bipartisan commitment to using
the treaty mechanism for control and regulation of U.S. national
security interests regarding the proliferation and possible
expansion of nuclear weapon systems. The general consensus
with regard to the CTBT is that the treaty is in the national
security interests of the United States, and that the obligations
it generates are de minimis compared to the rights that accrue
to the United States.427
At the foundational level, there is the link between ideology
and national security. A number of senators perceive this link to
be impermeable. Those senators may never support a U.S.
agreement on nuclear arms control, even if such an agreement
can be clearly shown to support the national security interest of
the United States. The Republican Whip, Senator Kyl, "warned
that arms control does nothing but constrain the United States,
while allowing evil states' nuclear-arms programs to grow
unchecked."428 "Which is the real threat?" he asked. "Thousands
of nuclear weapons in the American and Russian arsenals, or a
nuclear Iran and North Korea?"429
While this approach does not hold together from a policy
standpoint-witness the early Bush Administration's total lack
of success at stopping nuclear proliferation to Iran and North
Korea-it is intuitively compelling. Obama's vision of a world
where the United States gives up some of its own nuclear
arsenal in order to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
then uses that goodwill to fend off proliferation in the Middle
427. See KAEGAN MCGRATH, BATTLE LINES BEING DRAWN IN THE CTBT DEBATE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST U.S.
RATIFICATION (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2009), available at http://www.nti.org/
e researchle3_us ratification.html ("[T]here is an emerging consensus that U.S.
ratification is within reach.").
428. Barron Young Smith, The War On Obama's Nuclear Agenda, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/the-war-obamas-nuclear-agenda.
429. Id.
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East and Northeast Asia, is far less clear-cut than Kyl's vision,
in which we build impregnable missile defenses and keep as
many nukes as possible in order to threaten our enemies.430
Nevertheless, it is the case that the diplomatic effect of not
adopting the CTBT will have long-term effects on the credibility
of U.S. leadership in areas of global security and peace. In 1999,
when the Senate defeated the treaty, only fifty-one states had in
fact ratified it.431 Today, 182 states have signed the Treaty, and
151 states have ratified it.432 The states outside of the treaty
include North Korea, China, India, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and
Israel.433 Thus, the United States is diplomatically identified
with regimes that are disrespected internationally for their
nuclear arms policies. It should be noted as well that the United
States was the principal proponent of the CTBT and, in fact, its
first signatory.434 It should also be noted that the other great
nuclear power-Russia-joined the treaty in 2000, in the face of
right-wing skeptics who said that Moscow would not ratify it.435
In addition, this Treaty cannot come into force unless the United
States ratifies it.436
Thus, globally, the United States is seen as a stumbling
block preventing the success of the Treaty. Moreover, states that
have not ratified the Treaty will be under enormous compulsion
to do so, once the United States has ratified it and it has come
into force. Thus, there are compelling and diplomatic reasons for
the Senate to give its advice and consent for the ratification of
the CTBT.
In 2007, Senator Lugar was asked what he thought the
prospects were for the ratification of the CTBT.437 He replied,
430. See id.
431. DuNLOP & PREEZ, supra note 416.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See William Clinton, President, Remarks by the President to the 52nd Session
of the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 22, 1997), http://www.state.gov/www/issues/
970922_clinton.unga.html (calling the CTBT "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize"
in arms control history); see also CTBTO PREPARATORY COMM'N, 1977-94 RENEWED
TEST-BAN COMMITMENTS, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-1945-1993/.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Senator Richard G. Lugar, A Conversation on Russia at the Brookings
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"[...] I think they are not good, in large part because I have not
seen a change in constituencies that debated the issue the last
time."438 However, there are enough nonpartisan voices in the
Senate on this issue that appropriate political communication
could seal their commitment to provide the two-thirds vote
required for advice and consent.439 Even among influential
Republican interest groups, several prominent Republicans now
call for ratification-including Henry Kissinger, George Schultz,
and William Perry.440 In fact, many Republicans who voted
against ratification in 1999 may be persuaded that ratification
now is, in fact, in the U.S. national security interest.441 Indeed,
policy makers from all backgrounds have begun to drop a rigid
ideological or dogmatic view of the nation's national security and
tentatively move in the advantageous direction of the rule of
international agreements.442
For example, Senator Kyl has "argued that the CTBT is
unverifiable-meaning that the United States might somehow
'fall behind' while other nations cheat on the treaty, setting off
small, secret nuclear blasts that we cannot detect in order to
improve their nuclear arsenals."443 He also argued that the
Institution 36 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/l-/media/Files/
events/2007/l008lugar/20071008.pdf.
438. Id.
439. See Samuel R. Berger, Sam Nunn & William J. Perry, Case for Ratifying
Nuclear Test Ban, POLITICO, June 2, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0609/23191.html.
440. See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, Op-
Ed., Toward a Nuclear-Free World, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A13.
441. See Berger, supra note 439 (assessing significant progress towards CTBT
ratification). "[Former Secretary Shultz recently noted that Republicans 'might have
been right voting against it some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now,
based on these new facts."' Id.
442. See Shultz, supra note 440 (issuing a call for a bipartisan review to examine
the scientific and technological improvements in the capability of the Treaty's
monitoring systems and to evaluate advances that will assure the reliability and safety
of the U.S. stockpile); see also Berger, supra note 439 (worrying that "the stage is being
set for another calamitous showdown--one that will set back not only America's national
security but our leadership in a dangerous world," and urging that "[w]e have to build a
bipartisan path forward on CTBT).
443. The War on Obama's Nuclear Agenda, http:/Iblogs.tnr.comltnrfblogs/
the-plank/archive/2009-/04/29/the-war-on-obama-s-nuclear -agenda.aspx (Apr. 29, 2009,
23:56 EST).
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"United States-which has abided by the test ban's terms for
almost two decades, even though it hasn't been ratified-cannot
maintain its nuclear arsenal without violating the ban."444 Yet,
developments have taken place since 1999-including advances
in research and technology-that strengthen the rational
argument for ratification and may be persuasive to Republican
moderates.445 In light of these advances, many previously
opposed to the CTBT may perceive new value in the CTBT as a
cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime.
Perhaps the most important development in favor of ratification
is the successful regime of effective verifiability.
Through the CTBT's regime of verification, scientists of the
treaty organ essentially police states to ensure that "if the other
side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily
significant way, we would be able to detect such a violation in
time to respond effectively, and thereby deny the other side the
benefit of the violation."446 In the past, one of the most
important objections to the CTBT has been that a country may
employ a form of decoupled nuclear tests.447 Yet, despite the use
of this detection-evading technique, the National Academy of
Sciences has concluded that a decoupled test with a yield of
larger than one to two kilotons could not be hidden.448 Tests
below this yield are not of use to the testing state, nor would
they have the capacity to affect the strategic balance regarding
the United States.449 The Senate, in fact, accepted a similar
analysis regarding STARTI-yet that bilateral agreement was
444. Id.
445. DUNLOP & PREEZ, supra note 416.
446. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This was the definition of Paul Nitze,
who served as President Ronald Reagan's chief negotiator for the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and was appointed as Special Advisor to the President and
Secretary of State on arms control. Academy of Achievement, Paul Nitze Biography,
http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/nit0bio-1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
447. See NAS Study, supra note 324, at 46 (noting the difficulty of monitoring
underground, or "cavity decoupl[ed]," nuclear tests). Using this technique to avoid
detection, a nuclear-testing state could reduce the measurable yield of the test by a
factor of seventy. Id.
448. Id. at 46-48.
449. DUNLOP & PREEZ, supra note 416.
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ultimately ratified.450 The NAS concluded its study as follows:
Very little of the benefit of a scrupulously observed
CTBT regime would be lost in the case of clandestine
testing within the considerable constraints imposed by
the available monitoring capabilities. Those countries
that are best able to successfully conduct such
clandestine testing already possess advanced nuclear
weapons of a number of types and could add little, with
additional testing, to the threats they already pose or
can pose to the United States. Countries of lesser
nuclear test experience and design sophistication would
be unable to conceal tests in the numbers and yields
required to master nuclear weapons more advanced
than the ones they could develop and deploy without
any testing at all.
The worst-case scenario under a no-CTBT regime
poses far bigger threats to U.S. security-sophisticated
nuclear weapons in the hands of many more
adversaries-than the worst-case scenario of
clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the
constraints posed by the monitoring system.451
Since 1999, there has been considerable progress in the
capacity to monitor radionuclide and noble gas emissions from
an underground nuclear explosion.452 The CTBTO Preparatory
Commission has already put into place three new radionuclide
noble gas measuring systems.453 These technologies permit the
detection of abnormal levels of noble gases and are able to plot
atmospheric transport modeling to identify the time and location
of the source of the emissions.454 Today, 80% of the IMS are
450. Id.
451. NAS Study, supra note 324, at 10-11.
452. DUNLOP & PREEZ, supra note 416.
453. Id.
454. See Peter Chen, Gerhard Wotawa & Andreas Becker, The Importance of
Atmospheric Transport Modeling: Over Ten Years of Cooperation Between the World
Meteorological Organization and the CTBTO, CTBTO SPECTRUM, Sept. 2008, at 24,
25-27 (explaining the enhanced capabilities of detection since the WMO-CTBTO
cooperation agreement in 2000).
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certified either as operational or in their testing phase.455 In
short, enormous strides have been made in both the technology
and the science of verification. These developments are vastly in
advance of the situation in 1999.456
It should be noted that the United States benefits currently
from the monitoring process under both the NPT and the
CTBT.457 In particular, the United States benefits from the
monitoring stations in China, Russia, Iran, and other security-
sensitive venues.458 Moreover, the U.S. Air Force cooperated
with the Agency to build an eighteen million dollar hydro-
acoustic facility on Wake Island.459 The Wake Initiative rounded
out a hydro network of eleven stations enabling the agency to
listen to all of the oceans with the confidence of detecting even a
micro-level explosion.460
The monitoring system of the CTBT is "operating on a
provisional basis."461 If the Treaty enters into force, it will also
authorize on-site inspections of suspicious activity.462 The
Treaty Organization believes that, with inspections, the
Organization will be able to detect any possible nuclear test that
is militarily important.463 At present, three-quarters of the
planned 320 monitoring centers are built, certified, and on-
line.464 They each use "one of four technologies: seismic, sensing
the shock waves of an underground blast; hydro-acoustic,
listening for underwater explosions; infra-sound, picking up low-
frequency sound of... atmospheric test[ing]; and radionuclide
detection, sampling the air for the radioactive byproducts [of the
455. DUNLOP & PREEZ, supra note 416.
456. Id.
457. Charles J. Hanley, Obama Treaty Push Hinges on Global 'Listening' Net, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 19, 2009, available at http://www.usnews.com
articles/science/2009-/05/19/obama-treaty-push-hinges-on-global-nuclear-listening-
net.html.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Hanley, supra note 457.
464. Id.
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testing] ."465
The intervening ten years have witnessed developments
that respond to senatorial concerns about the CTBT. In
particular, the technological developments and improvements on
issues of verification as well as the integrity of U.S. arsenals
provide a promising background for the campaign to secure
ratification of the CTBT.466 Beyond the developments in senate
opinion, regimes of verification, and stockpile effectiveness,
there have also been developments in global expectations
regarding leadership in nuclear control and divestment.467 For
example, at NATO's April 3-4 Summit in France and Germany
last year (2009), where many had expected NATO to endorse the
entry into force of the CTBT (as NATO had done prior to the
Bush Administration), NATO declined to address the role of
nuclear deterrence on alliance security.468 It would seem that
even U.S. international alliances will now decline to make legal
arguments on behalf of an uncommitted United States.
From a juridical perspective, the critical importance of the
CTBT is that it gives efficacy to international law and
international agreements concerning the control and regulation
of nuclear weapons systems. The treaty-based method for
securing controls over nuclear weapon systems has been and
remains one of the most important techniques for the
responsible management of nuclear arsenals in the world
community. U.S. ratification would speed up the entry into force
of the CTBT and would bring the authority of the U.N. Security
Council squarely behind the ban on testing worldwide.
Clearly, the Democratic leadership is committed to
ratification. The Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations
Committee, John Kerry, stated that "the new president should
urge the Senate to ratify a treaty banning nuclear weapons
testing... there needs to be a massive, new commitment to the
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. See Oliver Meier, Steinmeier Calls for U.S. to Withdraw Nukes, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, May 2009, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act2009_5/
Steinmeier (asking the U.S. leadership, including President Obama and Hillary Clinton,
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counter proliferation and testing ban efforts ... the nuclear
issue has to be much more front and center in the next
administration."469 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the
CTBT "a critical proliferation tool."470 She also recognized the
diplomatic effects of ratification.471 Namely, she believes that
ratification is "essential to restoring American leadership."472
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the CTBT will be
given the advice and consent of the Senate. As many have noted,
it will take time and carefully orchestrated efforts to ensure that
the vote on U.S. ratification does not break down evenly along
party lines.473 The proceedings for the Senate must be
comprehensive and detailed. It will be important that the
proceedings are seen to be bipartisan and thorough. These
hearings should generate public awareness, and involve NGO
advocacy networks, as well as public opinion, to build support
for the Treaty. The President's own social network could be a
critical ally in this work. It would be of value if the President
appointed a White House liaison to the Senate in order to
monitor and facilitate the orchestration of the CTBT process.
By many estimates, the Senate is likely to vote again on the
CTBT as early as this year.474 In the time until that vote, a
great deal of political skill, public awareness, and citizen
advocacy will be critical to the ratification of this important
treaty. U.S. ratification of the CTBT protects U.S. national
interests and, in doing so, provides for the peace and security of
humankind.
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